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KEY TERMS: A BRIEF DISCUSSION 
Traditional Authorities: The term traditional authority is one which is used to refer to those persons said to 
govern on a ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ basis. Traditional authorities are sometimes referred to as 
traditional leaders who occupy various ranks such as chiefs, paramount chiefs, headmen and sub-
headmen. The terminology used to identify such persons has shifted over time. Under the apartheid 
government, traditional authorities were defined as tribal authorities (see Bantu Authorities Act of 1951). 
Since 1994, they have mostly been referred to as ‘traditional authorities’ or ‘traditional leaders’ (Ntsebeza, 
1999: 7). This thesis makes use of both of these terms which is in keeping with scholarship on the 
subject.  
 
Freehold Area: A freehold area is one where the system of landholding is constituted in individuals or 
groups and registered in the central Deeds Registry. These areas are also described as freehold areas or 
titled localities. In sub-Saharan Africa, roughly ten per cent of the land is held under freehold (private) title 
which is a small percentage compared to those persons living in 'communal' areas (Deininger, 2003: 62 
cited in Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006).  This thesis is limited to a discussion of people in rural areas 
living in titled localities.  
 
Landowner: In South Africa, people living on 'communal' land are considered de facto owners of such 
land. This means that while they do not have legal ownership of land in accordance with Roman-Dutch 
property law, they have constitutionally protected rights to live on that land (Cousins, 2002). This thesis 
does not deal with this category of “landowner” but rather, those residents of kwaMeyi village who are de 
jure landowners. Their land is registered at the Deeds Office and proof of ownership is constituted in a 
title deed. Other terms for landowner are titleholder or freeholder (Kingwill, 2008).  
 
Rural Residents:  This thesis defines people living in rural areas as ‘rural residents’ as opposed to 
categorizing them as ‘rural people’. Rural residents are people who live in rural areas for a time but may 
leave in pursuit of employment or other opportunities to be found in urban centres of the country. By the 
same token, there are people who reside in urban areas that maintain links with the rural areas where 
they come from, and pertinently, show allegiance to traditional leaders governing these areas. Therefore, 
the urban/rural dichotomy does not adequately capture the reality on the ground where people, resources 
and ideas circulate. As Pahl (1960; 299) commented, “...some people are in the city, but not of it, whereas 














There is little doubt that traditional leaders continue to make an indelible mark on the practice of politics 
across the continent of Africa. In democratising South Africa, the relevance of this institution is debated 
extensively. In the main, traditional leaders are described as the embodiment of patriarchy, comprised of 
unelected male representatives who rule with a “clenched fist” on an unwilling populous (Mamdani, 1996: 
23). It is argued that traditional authorities “...can only secure legitimacy by drawing its sustenance from 
the modern state, working as a complement to democratic local government” (Southall and Kropiwnicki, 
2003: 76).  In addition to this, it is believed that traditional leaders are able to assert their authority 
because they control the allocation of land in rural areas, thereby forcing people to show their allegiance 
within a system of dependency (Ntsebeza, 2005). 
 
In light of these assertions, this thesis answers two questions: do traditional leaders have a role to play in 
democratising South Africa? Is their only source of legitimacy that which is extended to them by the state 
or could there be “multiple legitimacies” which work to ensure their authority (Williams, 2010: 17)? The 
evidence generated from fieldwork conducted in the village of kwaMeyi indicates that traditional 
authorities are not dependent on the state for legitimacy because, in reality, they have no state given 
powers to control critical resources. Despite several pieces of legislation which recognise the authority of 
traditional leaders in South Africa, their roles, powers and functions are undefined. Instead, it is elected 
officials who exercise power in rural areas as they are constitutionally mandated to provide development 
and are financed by the state to do so. 
 
This reality forces one to consider how traditional leaders are able to govern as legitimate political 
authorities in the absence of powers to control resources. In kwaMeyi, this question is compounded by 
the fact that the village is a titled locality. While most scholars believe that “...in the areas where chiefs 
rule, there is no individual freehold title” in KwaMeyi this is not the case (Williams, 2010: 8; Budlender et 
al, 2011). The village is a freehold area where land is owned by individuals but is nonetheless governed 
by traditional leaders. 
 
By identifying that there are different sources of legitimacy, the findings of this thesis takes the debate 
beyond the oft repeated assertions that chiefs are legitimate only through the state and the control that 
they exercise over critical resources such as land. In kwaMeyi, the opposite appears to be true; chiefs 
and headmen exercise authority without controlling critical resources and are upheld as legitimate 
leaders, preferable even to elected officials within this area. Traditional leaders are said to govern in a 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background to the research: the discovery of a peculiar condition 
 
The initial focus of this thesis was to assess the relationship between women and traditional authorities in 
the village of kwaMeyi, Umzimkhulu district, given that it is a relationship that tends to embody patriarchal 
gender relations. It appears that in recent years, this patriarchal relationship has started to ebb away, at 
least in particular parts of rural South Africa. With regards to land allocation specifically, traditional 
authorities are increasingly allotting residential sites to women in their own right, and not through a male 
relative as is ‘customary’ practice (Cousins et al 2011; Claassens and Ngubane, 2008; Becker, 2006).1 
This phenomenon is reputedly a product of increasing “…awareness of post-1994 constitutional rights to 
gender equality…” noted by many researchers since the late 1980s and most especially since South 
Africa’s democratic elections in 1994 (Cousins, 2007: 303; see also Fay, 2005; Alcock and Hornby, 
2004). These changes are discussed in the context of people living on ‘communal’ areas in different parts 
of South Africa, where land allocation has historically been vested in traditional authorities. Therefore, my 
original intention was to ascertain the extent to which traditional leaders in kwaMeyi were engaging with 
the principle of gender equality, especially as it relates to customary practices of land allocation.  
 
To my surprise, after conversing with kwaMeyi residents, I discovered that the village is not a ‘communal 
area’ but one that is constituted by freehold title. In this locality (as in much of the Umzimkhulu district) 
people live under a system of freehold tenure, on land that is legally owned by a small number of 
individuals. What is atypical about this condition of private ownership is that the landowners are black 
Africans having acquired their land during the colonial era when most black Africans were living in what 
was then known as the locations, and later reserves (Beinart and Bundy, 1987; Beinart et al 1986; 
Hammond-Tooke, 1964).2 KwaMeyi village is one of a minority of areas where the colonial state made 
provision for black people to own land, reflecting a “rarity of freehold titles that has survived in African 
areas over the long term” (Kingwill, 2008: 184).  
 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, the terms ‘culture’ ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’ are used interchangeably to articulate beliefs and behaviours that are said 
to be indigenous in character and historically rooted. I acknowledge that culture is not a bounded entity but an ever-changing 
phenomenon that is shaped by, as much as it shapes, people’s lived experiences. As a result, sections of this paper that make use 
of these terms will not be contained in quotation marks for ease of reading but should be read as contentious nonetheless.  
2 The terms ‘black African’, ‘black’ or ‘African’ are used to describe kwaMeyi residents who classify themselves thus. In this thesis, 
these terms are not necessarily inclusive of those classified as ‘Coloured’ or ‘Indian’ as in the broader sense reflected in 
contemporary South African legislation and/or laws and policies. However, it is important to make this distinction because of the 
rarity of private ownership of land by black Africans during the colonial and apartheid eras.  It is acknowledged that these are highly 













In light of this reality, it was not surprising to learn that land allocation is not vested in traditional 
authorities but is a responsibility carried solely by kwaMeyi landowners. These landowners demarcate 
certain portions of their land to those requesting space for residential purposes through a system of rent-
tenancy that dates back to the late 1800s (Beinart and Bundy, 1987). What is even more peculiar about 
this circumstance is that even without powers to allocate land kwaMeyi village is still governed by 
traditional leaders. This counters the widely-held assertions that traditional authorities derive their 
legitimacy and authority from their powers to control land which has been emphatically argued by 
Ntsebeza in his study of Xhalanga district in the Eastern Cape. Ntsebeza (2005: 14-15) states that “...the 
question of the legitimacy of traditional authorities is very much associated with their position in and 
control of the land allocation process at the local village and Tribal Authority levels.” Another peculiarity 
which arose was a finding that traditional leaders in kwaMeyi have no substantive powers to control 
critical resources, especially in the areas of service delivery and development. Once again, this 
contradicts the findings of other scholarship which posit that the legitimacy of traditional leaders is “...often 
a particular manifestation of state intervention” (Ribot, 2001: 77). Hence, these peculiarities formed the 
basis of my study.  
Research Questions 
 
In light of the aforementioned, this thesis is concerned with the roles of traditional leaders and whether or 
not the functions they serve legitimise their authority. Specifically, this thesis answers the following 
questions:  
 
1. What are the roles of traditional leaders in kwaMeyi village, given that land allocation is not one of 
them and yet it is a function that is described as being traditional leaders’ main source of 
legitimacy?  
 
2. What are the sources of legitimacy that traditional leaders draw from, if not derived from the 
control of land or state-given functions as is the case in most communal areas in South Africa? 
Setting the context: a brief historical consideration on the development of freehold 
tenure in kwaMeyi village  
 
Before answering these questions, it is necessary to address the peculiar circumstance of African 
landholding in KwaMeyi village. As with most small villages and peripheral spaces in South Africa, there 
is no literature detailing the conditions that led to freehold tenure in this village specifically, serve for 
archival material.3 However, because kwaMeyi village falls within the district of Umzimkhulu, it is possible 
to learn how black people obtained individual title from scholarly works which focus on the district as a 
whole.  
                                                 












Umzimkhulu, one of twenty-six districts that formed part of the Transkei, was the first of South Africa’s 
nominally ‘independent’ Bantustans (Spiegel, 1990). Umzimkhulu was one of three districts in the frontier 
area known as East Griqualand (the other two were Matatiele and Mount Currie - prior to the annexation 
of the territories that subsequently became consolidated into the Transkeian Territories. The territories 
were annexed in blocks from 1879 – 1894).4 Literature on its history reveals that Umzimkhulu became 
ethnically diverse, given that “...the currents of history swept together men and women differing widely in 
origin, language and culture” (Ross, 1976: 104). This heterogeneous locale, named “Nomansland” by 
colonial travellers and officials, was home to a number of chiefdoms: first claimed by the Mpondo in 1884, 
and then smaller chiefdoms such as Xesibe and particularly Bhaca and Ntlangwini people, all of whom 
were fleeing Zululand (Beinart et al, 1986; Beinart and Bundy, 1987). 
 
Nomansland was forever changed by the arrival of Adam Kok and his Griquas, who trekked across the 
Drakensburg to occupy this relatively under-populated area in 1862/3. In Adam Kok’s Griquas, Ross 
(1976: 104) explains that they were trying to “build themselves into a self-sufficient community…which 
were baulked by the activities and concerns of the white colonists.” A strong political force in the area, 
Adam Kok and his Griquas renamed the area East Griqualand, reflecting the stronghold that they 
eventually maintained over it and the other chiefdoms in the area. Most relevant for this thesis is the 
extent to which Griqua presence set the scene for African private land ownership in addition to ownership 
of land by chiefs, a highly unusual occurrence in most of colonial South Africa.  
 
The Griquas acquired individual land ownership after having established a somewhat beneficial 
relationship with Sir George Grey who was in fav ur of securing frontier areas under mixed occupation 
(white, coloured, European, African) of ‘loyal’ groups, eventually culminating in the establishment of the 
Glen Grey Act of 1894. This provision was in keeping with Cape colonial policy of the late nineteenth 
century which sought to “…create a class of African farmers along white lines” (Ntsebeza, 2005: 58). 
However, increasing white settler presence saw greater demand for farm land, and with that, the loss of 
Griqua land to white demands (Beinart and Bundy, 1987; Beinart et al, 1986). As a result of a number of 
factors, mostly poor agricultural production and/or the need to make mortgage repayments or access 
credit, Griqua people began to sell their land. This was taken advantage of by merchants like Donald 
Strachan who bought land from the Griqua and who soon amassed such wealth that “Umzimkhulu village 
became the Strachan company town” (Beinart et al, 1986: 48). By the 1910s, private ownership had 
moved from Griqua hands to white settler ownership and two thirds of Umzimkhulu had been demarcated 
as farmland (Beinart and Bundy, 1987).  
  
Prospective white farmers were not the only purchasers of Griqua land. Speculators and other interested 
colonial agents as well as missionaries such as the Trappist missionary took advantage of the desperate 
land sales by Adam Kok’s people (Beinart et al, 1986). What is of significance here is that the opportunity 
                                                 











did not pass the notice of chiefs and headmen as well as elite Africans in the area, those who sided with 
colonial agents in addition to educated professionals. chiefs lobbied their subjects to provide cattle for 
capital and were thus able to gain land “in trust” especially in farms adjacent to their locations (Beinart 
and Bundy, 1987). As Beinart and Bundy (1987: 59) explained, “…chiefs and headmen seldom 
discouraged new settlement, for it provided them with a source of income from dues and broadened the 
base of their followers.” For elite Africans, purchasing land, and the “assembling [of] large numbers of 
followers around them“,  became a means of establishing oneself as headmen in their own right (Spiegel, 
1990: 60). These landowners then rented out subdivided portions of their land to other Africans in the 
area who needed a place to live.  By the early twentieth century, a system of rent-tenancy was firmly in 
place. Coupled with poor agricultural yields and the need for farmers to generate other sources of 
income, this system forced ordinary rural residents to become subject to both chiefs and landowners. As 
Beinart and Bundy (1987: 51) noted, these events laid the basis for Umzimkhulu to become “...one of the 
Cape districts with the largest area of private land in African ownership at the time.”  
 
These historical occurrences help us to understand how black ownership emerged in the village of 
kwaMeyi.  Today, Umzimkhulu is composed of parcels of land owned by the state; small pockets that are 
considered communal areas and a vast majority of freehold land that is in the hands of individuals; some 
of whom are chiefs, while others are descendants of landowners. KwaMeyi village, the site of this study, 
remains in the hands of individuals who hold freehold title. The chief in the area does not own land or 
control land allocation processes in this village, although he owns land elsewhere in the district. Despite 
this, kwaMeyi village falls under his jurisdiction. Exploring the manner in which he maintains his authority 
and legitimacy in such a context forms the basis of this thesis.  
Traditional leaders: a valued political and social entity 
 
This thesis argues that even in the absence of powers to allocate land or control key resources as 
determined by the state, traditional leaders are able to exercise a certain degree of authority as well as 
draw some measure of popular legitimacy.5 It must be stated that these levels of authority and legitimacy 
are highly variable and inextricably tied to the particular localities and histories where traditional 
authorities have jurisdiction. As Kingwill (2003: 5) makes clear, “...the efficacy, impact and local legitimacy 
of existing traditional authority structures varies enormously across different regions.” Structures of 
traditional governance are not homogeneous in their composition or character, causing some to be 
favoured while others are denigrated. The findings of this small study indicate that even without powers to 
control vital resources such as land, chiefs and headmen are able to exercise some measure of authority 
and popular legitimacy. It is the contention of this author that the legitimacy of traditional rulers is tied, not 
                                                 
5 See section “Theoretical Framework: The question of legitimacy - towards the application of a multiple legitimacies framework” for 












only to the functions they serve within their localised contexts, but the manner in which they perform 
these tasks. 
 
In the case of kwaMeyi village, the institution of traditional governance is able to exercise authority 
because of the manner in which they address the needs of their constituents. Traditional leaders are said 
to govern in a way that fits the moral order of kwaMeyi residents, thereby legitimising their authority. This 
can be seen in the area of development and service delivery, where even without powers to control 
critical resources, traditional leaders are viewed as preferable to elected officials. Traditional leaders are 
seen as more reliable and sensitive to the needs of the community and are most valued for the role they 
play in the area of dispute resolution. The unlikely hero of the story in this village is the chief and his 
headmen who, in their role as purveyors of justice and the related role as maintainers of peace, are able 
to enter into a “space for negotiation” so that tenants’ rights are protected (Berry, 2002: 655).6 This is a 
vitally important function in a context where tenants are unaware of their land rights and are otherwise 
powerless to defend themselves from possible eviction by landowners. Hence, chiefs and headmen 
maintain authority for the roles they serve and the manner in which they govern in what Williams (2010) 
terms performance and moral legitimacy. 
A broader argument and wider significance of the study: retraditionalisation and 
democracy 
 
If traditional institutions are not reliant on the legitimacy drawn from the exercise of power over resources, 
but a variety of other sources, then there is much to explore regarding their resilience in the current 
democratic dispensation. While it is not within the limits of this thesis to enter into a debate on the notion 
of democracy, which Ntsebeza (2005:23) describes as being “notoriously ambiguous” it is necessary to 
provide the definition that is used in this thesis. 
 
This thesis makes use of Kyed and Burr’s (2006) definition of democracy. These scholars argue that what 
is often times described as a resurgence of traditional leadership, or as “retraditionalisation” is not 
concerned with “...a return to the past, but an increased articulation of ‘tradition’, ‘roots’ and ‘belonging’ as 
part of a wider process of modernisation and/or reactions to these processes within the wider context of 
globalisation” (Kyed and Burr, 2006: 1; see Oomen, 2000 and 2005). Moreover, the institution of 
traditional leadership, a heterogeneous entity with varying degrees of influence and relevance, has long 
coexisted within diverse institutions and political logics (Beall and Ngonyama, 2009: 2; Kingwill, 2008). 
                                                 
6 The term community is used in acknowledgment of its contested meaning, particularly the assumption of oneness and 
connectedness that it imposes on people living in the same locale. Being cognizant of this, the term is still utilized because 
informants described themselves as belonging to one ‘community.’ Where it is mentioned, it is used as a way to reference their 
collective identity. Nonetheless, it is used with caution and an appreciation of its complexity.  Again, quotation marks are not utilized 
but the term is to be read as contentious in meaning (see Benedict Anderson. 1983. Imagined communities: reflection on the origin 












Therefore, one cannot conceive of democracy as a purely liberal project created by the West and 
imposed on the rest of the world in an unchanged, unresponsive form. Instead, as Kyed and Buur (2007: 
13) contend, democracy should be “…approached as a ‘political imaginary’ which appears in 
discourses…enacted in social and political spheres, but never made fully permanent…[T]he point is that 
democratisation is a process, (which) both formally and informally influence the role of traditional authority 
and vice versa.”  
 
If one is to accept that democracy is a “political imaginary,” that is shaped by multiple actors, then 
traditional leaders, who have governed in some form since pre-colonial times, will continue to influence 
the practice of politics on the continent. The character of democracy is shaped by the actions of traditional 
leaders including how they (re)define themselves and their role(s); those of the state as well as the views 
and expectations of their constituents. Williams (2010: 21) explains this as “...the dynamic interactions 
among the chieftaincy, the state and local populations in the struggle for political legitimacy.” Political 
legitimacy is sought after by both the state and traditional leaders as they strive to exercise exclusive 
control in rural areas. To this end, traditional leaders are taking on a more democratic nature while 
governments are known to invoke culture and tradition as a way to gain access in rural areas (Nyamnjoh, 
2003; Oomen, 2005).7 Williams captures these dynamics when he explains that “...the different moral 
orders-the ‘modern’ and the ‘traditional’ actually interact and blend together in important ways. Even 
though most contemporary accounts eschew the use of modern/traditional dichotomy to describe 
authority relations, the notion that there exists two separate worlds only serves to reinforce this idea” 
(Williams, 2010: 17). Blending so-called traditional and modern forms of governance is a process of 
legitimatisation that is complex and contradictory and one which challenges our very understanding of 
authority, and indeed democracy, in South Africa.   
Theoretical Framework: The question of legitimacy - towards the application of a 
multiple legitimacies framework 
Legitimacy and the control of vital or critical resources 
Those studying the nature and basis of the power of traditional authorities have been keenly concerned 
with the extent to which this institution can claim to be a legitimate form of governance, especially in a 
democratic era which favours representative governance over hereditary, traditional models of leadership. 
The legitimacy of traditional leaders has been debated enormously in a plethora of scholarly projects, 
most of which tie the longevity of traditional leaders to their ability to control key resources such as land 
(Ntsebeza, 2005; Peires, 2000; Mamdani, 1996), whilst others attribute their presence on the political 
landscape to state-led initiatives and laws (Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999; Kessel and Omen, 1997). 
Proponents of this view are fully aware that traditional leaders serve a multitude of functions but argue 
that their powers to control vital resources makes rural residents vulnerable to their authority, essentially 
                                                 
7 Nelson Mandela famously aligned himself with the Chieftaincy in his autobiography and in his address to the nation after his 











compelling their allegiance. What the majority of these works proclaim is that traditional leaders do not 
enjoy popular legitimacy, that is “...a popularly accepted claim to leadership and authority” (Wright, 1994: 
3-4). In order to answer the questions presented in this thesis, it is necessary to explore the question of 
legitimacy so as to better understand the reasons behind the resilience of the chieftaincy in kwaMeyi 
village, the site of this study, and in contemporary African politics. 
 
The control of land has always been central to the authority of chiefs in Africa. As Delius (2008: 218) 
explains,  
“[w]hen a chiefdom settled in a new unpopulated area, the chief, along with his councillors would point out 
particular areas to subordinate leaders who would in turn delineate areas for ward heads who in turn would 
convene processes for distributing areas of land to household heads on which to build and cultivate.”  
 
For centuries, chiefs and traditional leaders have been at the centre of land allocation practices, 
essentially establishing and securing the land rights of their ‘subjects’ (Beinart, 1982). Since then, chiefly 
power over land has been vital to their exercise of authority which, as Ribot (2001: 47) argues, “...has 
been the basis of ‘customary’ authorities in Africa” (2001: 73). In looking at the ineffective leadership of 
elected officials in “chief’s areas” across democratising Africa, Ribot (2001: 47-48) situates chiefs’ powers 
with their ability to control what he calls “real resources,” arguing that unless state bodies give these 
elected representatives autonomous decision-making powers in regard to critical resources, they will 
never be able to compete with chiefs for authority and legitimacy in rural areas.  
 
The connection between legitimacy and control of vital resources has been echoed by a number of other 
scholars. Lund (2002: 14) makes the case that “...the process of recognition of property rights by a 
politico-legal institution simultaneously constitutes a process of recognition of the legitimacy of this 
institution.” In his study of the Bafokeng chiefdom, Capps’s (2010) doctoral thesis, which takes a 
materialist analysis of the modern African chieftaincy, also highlights that “...the chief’s political legitimacy 
is dependent on his capacity to redistribute resources among the tribal community...” (Capps, 2010: 138). 
In the same vein, Shipton and Goheen (1992, 314) assert that “control of land is a central part of political 
leadership...can prop up a leader’s political power and authority and help define them.” Through their 
assertions, these authors are situating political legitimacy with powers to control resources that matter, 
especially if this control creates a certain level of dependency between themselves and people under 
their governance.   
 
The link between political legitimacy and control of key resources was a relationship that did not escape 
the observations and activities of colonial administrators. In a bid to impose colonial rule on Africans, 
chiefs were side-lined in favour of headmen in the control of land and other critical resources. In 
Traditional leaders in South Africa, Bank and Southall (1996) highlight what was to be the beginning of an 
agitated relationship between the state and the chieftaincy, which first sought to undermine their authority, 
and then later restore it in an on-going ambivalent relationship between the two political entities. Bank 











direct rule was imposed upon the formerly autonomous chiefdoms, the legitimacy of chiefs was 
deliberately undermined, and subaltern authority was widely - but not uniformly - devolved upon 
headmen.”  
 
Under the apartheid state and with the promulgation of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, chiefs were 
‘restored’ to their pre-colonial role as ‘custodians’ of land and given a number of other responsibilities. 
This ultimately served the needs of the apartheid state while pretending to have the concerns of rural 
people at heart (Ntsebeza, 2005; Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999).  Chiefly powers, and hence their 
legitimacy, were constituted through state-led laws and policies and no longer “...in a social order based 
on extended kinship relationships in which common interests predominated over those of individuals” 
(Stack, 1997: 6). Instead, as Mamdani (1996: 48) elucidates, “…colonial powers salvaged a wide-spread, 
time honoured practice, one of decentralised exercise of power, but freed that power of restraint, of peers 
or people.” Chiefs were thus legitimate authorities because of the state in what has been termed state 
legitimacy; as they were given powers to control key resources and hence people (Mamdani, 1996: 23). 
Although published over a decade ago, Mamdani’s Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the 
legacy of late colonialism (1996) has left an indelible mark on scholarly conceptions of the chieftaincy. His 
brazen and harsh view of this institution has become synonymous with decentralised despotism, where 
chiefs are upwardly accountable to the state rather than downwardly accountable to the subjects of their 
rule. The reconfiguration of their power base severed the popular legitimacy that chiefs enjoyed prior to 
colonial contact.  
 
Looking specifically at the South African case, Southall and Kropiwnicki (2003) highlight that the African 
National Congress (ANC) has tried to force traditi nal authorities to be upwardly accountable “…on the 
grounds that traditional authorities can only secure legitimacy by drawing its sustenance from the modern 
state, most notably by working as a complement to democratic local government” (2003: 76). However, 
rather than being a unidirectional relationship which sees the democratic state as legitimising the 
authority of the chieftaincy, Burr and Kyed (2005) note that these two political entities are engaged in a 
mutually reinforcing “legitimising process,” where the authority and legitimacy of the chiefs in the rural 
hinterlands gives weight to state bodies who are otherwise introducing new norms, values and practices 
that are for the most part, foreign (see also Williams, 2010). For government, “...legally bolstering the role 
of traditional leaders has been seen as a remedy for securing grassroots participation, developing a 
specifically African form of democracy, and bolstering state outreach and legitimacy in "weak states” (Burr 
and Kyed, 2005: 27). The weak-state hypothesis posits that chiefs are relied upon as a result of 
incapacitated state officials who do not have adequate resources to meet the huge developmental needs 
in rural areas or to ensure the provision of key services to rural residents (Koelbe and LiPuma, 2005; 
Ntsebeza, 2005; Ribot, 2001). Koelbe and LiPuma (2005: 91-92) note that weak states have emerged as 
a result of neoliberal economic policies which have constrained the government’s ability to “reach into the 
hinterlands.” From these arguments, it is clear that the ability of political leaders to control vital or critical 











Exploring other sources of legitimacy: the multiple legitimacies approach 
In Chieftaincy, the state and democracy: political legitimacy in post-apartheid South Africa, Williams 
(2010) acknowledges the importance of controlling vital resources in legitimising the authority of political 
leaders. However, in his analysis, he emphasises that there are multiple sources of legitimacy to be 
considered if one is to gain a deeper understanding on the resilience of the chieftaincy in the African 
context. He states that, 
“...in South Africa there are multiple sources of legitimacy that all leaders-chiefs as well as elected 
officials-can use to justify their rule. Each of the different sources of legitimacy offers people a 
particular set of symbols, values, political principles, institutions, rules and processes that are 
central to ruler-ruled relations and interactions” (2010:17-18).  
 
For Williams (2010), the ruler-ruled, or chieftaincy-society relations, as he often terms it, are what 
determine the legitimacy of political authorities. He defines political legitimacy as “an on-going process” 
where the ruler and the ruled critically evaluate the justifications that are put forth in the exercise of 
power. He argues that people are more inclined to follow rules, and hence follow leaders, if they behave 
in a manner that resonates with that society’s moral code and if that behaviour is beneficial to that society 
(2010: 20). William’s conception of political legitimacy has two dimensions: moral legitimacy and 
performance legitimacy. 
 
Moral legitimacy is defined as the “...norms, values, myths, nd symbols of the society that are used to 
define and evaluate ‘appropriate’ political action” (Williams, 2010: 21). At its core, moral legitimacy is 
about a society’s worldview, which determines how things ought to be done, distinguishing between what 
is right and what is wrong (Williams, 2010: 21-22). Williams (2010)  asserts that there are multiple moral 
orders and that in terms of political governance, South Africa is faced with merging a moral code based 
on democratic constitutional principles (propagated by the state) and one which is considered pre-
colonial; that of “African tradition and culture" (which, controversially, is said to be upheld by traditional 
leaders).8 The state and the chieftaincy are engaged in what Oomen describes as a “scramble for 
legitimacy” which is “...played out through the culture card” (2005: 3).  Acknowledging that “African 
culture” is not static and that it can be used as a resource to assemble power and authority, it must be 
recognized that the notion of an “authentic African culture” continues to be a frame of reference for many 
Africans even if it is difficult to determine exactly what “African culture” is. Nonetheless, “...the ideological 
understandings of the chieftaincy, which predate indirect rule, continue to provide a frame of reference for 
many in the rural areas” (Williams, 2010: 27). One aspect of this framework is the notion of the chief as a 
“symbol of unity” (Williams, 2010: 27; see also Logan, 2011; Oomen, 2005). The belief that traditional 
leaders are better at maintaining peace and harmony, and that they have done so since pre-colonial 
                                                 
8 Traditional authorities primarily identify themselves as “custodians of culture” (see National House of Traditional Leaders website 
http://www.nhtl.gov.za). It is a role bares importance for people under traditional governance, even for those living under a 











times, continues to legitimise their authority in rural areas. However, this is only one source of their 
legitimacy and it alone cannot account for the resilience of traditional leaders as political authorities.  
 
Performance legitimacy is presented as another source of political legitimacy for traditional leaders 
(Williams, 2005: 28).  Performance legitimacy concerns the performance of political leaders in the area of 
service delivery and infrastructural development, especially in the long neglected rural areas. 
Performance legitimacy is about the manner in which political leaders exercise power and how those in 
society evaluate this process, but with specific reference to the provision of goods and services (2010: 
28). This dimension of political legitimacy is about the ability of traditional leaders or state officials to 
provide for the needs of community members which increases local people’s perceptions that they are 
bona fide political leaders. As Williams (2010: 28) asserts, “...in the long-term, legitimacy must be based 
on something more than performance or expectations of performance, but in the short term, it is possible 
that rulers can generate trust if they are able to deliver the political and economic goods that are 
promised” (Williams, 2010: 28). In this conception of legitimacy, controlling resources can legitimise the 
authority of a political leader but only in so far as their exercise of power is deemed appropriate and fitting 
with local norms and values. 
 
Logan’s (2011: 1) very recent Africa-wide investigation on the roles and legitimacy of traditional leaders 
makes use of Williams’s (2010) multiple legitimacies framework and finds that: 
“…traditional leaders are resilient because of – not in spite of – who they are and what they do. Their 
character as leaders, flawed as it may be, and their connection with and accessibility to the people in their 
communities, set them apart from politicians and government officials. They are more available as problem 
solvers, and they have the advantages of local knowledge and an understanding of community norms and 
practices that can make them effective resolvers of local conflict as well. These roles, not surprisingly, are 
highly valued by the communities that they serve.” 
At the heart of the multiple legitimacies framework is the idea that “...political actors must make decisions 
consistent with both the underlying moral and performance dimensions to remain legitimate” (Williams, 
2010: 30). They must do so by engaging with norms and values of that society’s moral code and in a way 
that is beneficial to the whole community. In this conception, political legitimacy is not simply about what a 
leader does for a community, but the manner in which they do it. 
Methodology 
Choosing the research site9 
The research site of kwaMeyi village, which is part of the Umzimkhulu district, was selected as a result of 
a conversation with a resident of that area, Sakhile, a colleague and friend studying at the University of 
                                                 











Cape Town.10 After informing him of my interest in the relationship between traditional authorities and 
women’s land rights, he indicated that there was a robust chieftaincy in his home village, and furthermore, 
that it was characterised by female headed households who had access to land independently. Sakhile 
alerted me (albeit erroneously) to the changing practices of the traditional authority in this locale, in line 
with the ‘new phenomenon’ being articulated by several researchers noted in the Background section of 
this chapter. Hence, kwaMeyi village appeared a suitable area in which to situate my study.  
 
Preliminary Research 
Following this conversation, I conducted preliminary research on kwaMeyi village in order to deepen my 
understanding of the area. Unfortunately, there was little material on the village itself. Instead, most of the 
information detailed the demographic and socio-economic status of the district as a whole. This 
information was gathered from the Umzimkhulu Integrated Development Plan from 2006. Other internet 
sources which augmented my preliminary research included news articles, government websites and 
those detailing information on the kinds of tourism in the area. While I came away with an initial picture of 
life in Umzimkhulu, specifically its demographic makeup and socio-economic and political challenges, the 
information that was available did not highlight the existence of freehold tenure in the area or shed light 
on the roles played by the traditional authority there. Hence, I assumed that like most of rural South Africa 
where traditional authorities are present, kwaMeyi villagers were living on communal land which was 
allocated to individuals along customary lines by the governing traditional authority.  As explained at the 
beginning of this chapter, this was not the case.  
Conducting fieldwork: lessons learnt 
One of the crucial lessons learnt after conducting fieldwork was that one needs to be cautious of making 
assumptions, even if those assumptions are based on dominant voices within the academy. Preliminary 
research had not alerted me to the existence of traditional authorities on freehold land. The weight of 
scholarship, research and literature ties the existence of traditional authorities to the ‘communal’ areas, 
also referred to as former reserves or Bantustans, where they exercise control over land and related 
resources. Communal areas of the former homelands are therefore conceived of as the traditional areas 
of customary rule, obscuring another reality of rule by chiefs on black owned, privately held land since 
colonial contact, a condition that reflects “the rarity of freehold titles that have survived in African areas 
over the long term” (Kingwill, 2008: 184). This omission has caused researchers to conclude that “...in the 
areas where chiefs rule, there is no individual freehold title; instead people occupy their land with the 
consent of the chief” (Williams, 2010: 8; see also Budlender et al, 2011).  
 
                                                 
10 I have used a pseudonym to protect his identity and that of his family with whom I interacted during my research and were central 
to the study as explained further in this chapter. Pseudonyms have also been employed to protect the identities of other informants, 











Hence, in kwaMeyi, I expected to find similar patterns of land allocation and a structure of traditional 
governance whose source of power was land allocation. However, through engaging with various 
residents in kwaMeyi village, what came to the fore was the existence of a traditional authority that 
operated despite having no powers to allocate land. As a novice researcher, I realised the importance of 
allowing the reality on the ground to highlight particular issues, as opposed to carrying one’s presupposed 
hypotheses into the field, even if these hypotheses are based on the works of well-respected researchers, 
writers and academics. Indeed, Streiner and Sidani (2010: 2) have noted that “...any study, no matter how 
well designed, will face challenges in its execution. Reality is not always (or even usually) as neat as 
implied in any book’s description of the research process or any publication’s report of the study protocol 
and its findings.”  
Data Collection 
Research Assistant  
As a Zimbabwean national, I realised that conducting research with an ‘insider’, that is, someone who is 
known by the community, would have several advantages. Hence, I invited my colleague, Sakhile to work 
as a Research Assistant. Sakhile is a Masters student at the University of Cape Town. He was born in 
kwaMeyi village in 1985 and was educated outside the village since the age of ten. The first advantage of 
this was that he is familiar with the members of the community and has some knowledge of their history 
and the interpersonal dynamics between residents in the area. This familiarity allowed me to ‘access’ the 
community more readily and establish trust and rapport which are crucial elements when carrying out 
fieldwork.  
 
However, because Sakhile was not educated in kwaMeyi village, and only visited once or twice a year 
since the age of 16, he had some degree of social distance, a level of ‘outsiderness’ that allowed 
informants to relay information that they may not have conveyed had he been a permanent resident of 
kwaMeyi village. A certain level of social distance was important given that the interviews centred on the 
sensitive issues of chieftaincy and land rights.  In addition to this, Sakhile could speak the local dialect, 
which is a combination of Baca, Xhosa and Zulu languages. As an Nguni speaker, I was able to follow 
interviews as well as rely on him when I was unable to fully explain myself or needed to determine what 
was being conveyed by informants. 
Fieldwork 
Participant Observation 
Fieldwork was conducted between the 14th of July and the 12th of August 2009. A key component of 
fieldwork is participant observation; where the researcher strives to immerse themselves into the 











form of participant observation because we cannot study the social world without being part of it.” The 
best way to become an ‘insider’ in the ‘new world’ is to live in the community as fully as possible. To this 
end, I decided to live with my Research Assistant and his family. They assisted me in determining who I 
should speak to for my study, and especially in making contact with the chief of kwaMeyi. They welcomed 
me as a member of their family. I participated in domestic chores, met their friends and family and got 
insight into the everyday experiences of life in this particular village. I also frequented the district’s city 
centre where I visited shops, a newly opened mall and other small outlets and businesses. In so doing, I 
was able to familiarise myself with residents of the area and understand their everyday struggles and 
triumphs.  
Snowball Sample 
As mentioned previously, I relied heavily on the knowledge of my Research Assistant and his family in 
determining who would be most suitable to interview for the study. It was from these initial contacts that I 
worked on a referral system, a methodology known as snowballing, where one’s sample becomes larger 
as each contact suggests others to interview (Pierce, 2008). Using this methodology allows the 
researcher to overcome two problems in the field: access and trust.  Overcoming these obstacles was 
important for me given that I was unknown in the area and outsiders tend to be regarded with suspicion.  
Semi-structured Interviews 
All the interviews conducted were semi-structured. This methodology mainly consists of open-ended 
questions which provide informants with more space to detail their responses as they see fit as opposed 
to closed questions or surveys which elicit limited answers. Semi-structured interviews allow for more 
‘natural’ interaction which is consistent with the interpretive approach to research (Kelly and Terre 
Blanche, 1999: 128). These interviews were conducted in the homes of informants, being careful not to 
disrupt their activities such as cooking or cleaning.  Interviews normally lasted between one and two 
hours, depending on the willingness and time constraints of the informants. 
 
For this study, a total of 12 semi-structured interviews were conducted, with 8 being audio recorded and 4 
recorded on personal field notes (see subheading “Field notes”).The interviews engaged 5 men and 7 
women from the ages of 18 to 73.  The respondents were rural residents of various social classes, 
education levels and occupations. With reference to the traditional authority in KwaMeyi, I managed to 
speak to the chief, a charismatic Mr Mavana, who was presiding over kwaMeyi village at the time of my 
research. In addition, I interviewed Gogo Liza, an elderly but vibrant woman, who served as a former 
headwoman in the Mvolosi Traditional Authority of kwaMeyi. At the time of research, I was unable to 
locate any other traditional authorities in the area, especially because there was a burgeoning battle for 
the position of chief. The rival chief, Mr Dlamini, was challenging the authenticity of chief Mavana’s 











problematic at this time. Nonetheless, ordinary rural residents were able to articulate what they believed 
to be the role of traditional authorities in their area.  
 
From these conversations, it became necessary to interview the ANC Ward Councillor for the area, who 
was commonly referred to as ‘Magic’. However, several attempts at reaching him proved fruitless. On the 
whole, informants were forthcoming and cooperative. They were landholders, prospective landholders or 
tenants, all of whom narrated their experiences of living on freehold land and of being governed by both a 
traditional authority and Ward Councillors.  
Field notes 
What emerges while one is conducting fieldwork does not always come to the fore during scheduled 
interview times. Conversations at the dinner table, and especially those with my host family, yielded rich 
material on the everyday happenings in the village of kwaMeyi and those pertaining to my research 
questions. It was on these occasions that using a recorder proved difficult as it threatened the willingness 
of informants to speak freely. The use of a journal proved invaluable in recording the statements made 





Conducting research is not a linear process. It is, therefore, important that analysis of the data speaks to 
the issues and themes that arise, rather than any preconceived ideas that the researcher may have 
carried into the field. Because my initial assumptions about kwaMeyi were dispelled, I needed to engage 
with the data collected in such a way as to see what themes came to the fore. To do so, I made use of the 
grounded theory approach. This approach requires that the researcher identifies themes and theory as 
derived from data rather than shaping the data to fit existing theories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This 
strategy makes use of coding, such as open coding, axial coding and selective coding in order to do so. 
The data collected from fieldwork in kwaMeyi was coded using open coding, which Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) describe as line by line analysis; where one surveys texts to retrieve themes, key phrases and 
statements.  
 
As a means to ensure that the analysis was not overly subjective, the constant comparative method was 
adopted. Leedy and Ornord (2010: 142) explain that this method requires the researcher to move back 
and forth between the data and key literature so as to sharpen and focus analysis. By refereeing to the 
data, and then to the literature, I was able, to not only identify common themes, but also consider them in 













The issues of land ownership and traditional governance tie in with people’s sense of belonging and 
identity. As such, questions concerning land ownership and allegiances to chiefs, needed to be treated 
with sensitivity and discretion. Every effort was made to maintain confidentiality and guarantee that the 
information provided would not be discussed with other informants. Informants were assured that their 
names and any identifying information would only be known to interviewers and transcribers. Interviewees 
were informed of their right to stop the interview at any point and change their minds in regard to the use 
of the information they provided for this thesis. All interviewees gave verbal consent which was recorded 
on audio files.  
Limitations of the study 
 
Given the unexpected reality that kwaMeyi village is one of a few titled localities in South Africa, it was 
necessary to briefly look at how this situation came to be. There is, unfortunately, scant literature on its 
formation, a challenge which would have been greatly remedied by some extensive archival research. 
However, lack of financial and material resources, as well as limited time, prevented the carrying out of 
this archival research. The archive would have been especially important in light of the peculiar condition 
of freehold tenure in kwaMeyi were black people have owned land independently for over a hundred 
years.  
 
To gain a historical perspective, I had to rely on the general history of Umzimkhulu district (under which 
kwaMeyi falls), as captured by Beinart and Bundy (1987) in Hidden struggles in rural South Africa: politics 
and popular movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape 1890-1930 as a key text for this information. 
To my knowledge, it is the only text which deals with the area’s history in thorough detail. Therefore, 
important historical moments are taken from this seminal work as a means to inform the findings of this 
small study.11  
                                                 
11 In the story on the formation of the village of kwaMeyi, two characters are common to all the narratives provided by older 
informants, namely Meyi Damoyi, Donald Strachan, and then the Griquas. Although the timelines given are not specific and there is 
a lot of contradiction in the testaments of these informants, a general pattern emerges. The story goes that a Malaysian man named 
Meyi Damoyi arrived in Nomansland (later to be called East Griqualand and then Umzimkhulu district) somewhere in the mid1800s, 
his ship having crashed at Port St Johns. After moving to the area, he married a local woman, maDlamini, had children and bought 
land for them. He then allocated smaller parcels of land to his children each time they were married, essentially cutting into pieces 
what was once one big parcel of land. Some informants reported that the land was purchased from the Griquas, others from the 
very famous Donald Strachan, a white settler who also bought property in the area. As populations increased, kwaMeyi land was 
sold and further subdivided until it became a fully-fledged village, taking its name of kwaMeyi or Meyi’s place from its original owner 
Meyi Damoyi. Future research on this area would necessitate the missing focus on archival material that is spread out in various 
archival storage houses throughout the country, which are situated in Mthatha, Cape Town and Pretoria and elsewhere. Interviews 













Structure of thesis: Chapter Outlines 
 
Chapter 2: A place for traditional leaders? A historical outline of the roles, powers and functions of 
traditional leaders sets out the relationship between the chieftaincy and the state from colonial contact 
through to present day. It goes on to enumerate that while traditional leaders have drawn legitimacy from 
the state, and exercised their powers without popular support, the contemporary situation reveals a 
different picture, one where traditional leaders are highly favoured in specific localities across South 
Africa. This chapter highlights that while the academic gaze has considered struggles against the 
chieftaincy in communal areas, they have all but missed the peculiar condition of chiefly rule in freehold 
areas and therefore, the sources of legitimacy that work to ensure their authority in such areas.   
 
Chapter 3: The role of chiefs in local government and development: an exploration of performance 
legitimacy tackles the notion of performance legitimacy with reference to the case study of kwaMeyi 
village. It demonstrates that traditional leaders are able to exercise authority in the area of development 
and service delivery because they govern in a manner that echoes the moral ethos of the community, and 
peculiarly, that they do so without powers to control critical resources. This chapter demonstrates that 
even in cases where elected officials are able to provide development to rural residents, it does not 
automatically mean that the community recognises them as legitimate political leaders 
 
Chapter 4: The role of chiefs in local government and development: an exploration of moral legitimacy 
looks at the importance of Chiefs in the area of dispute resolution. Here, Chiefs are upheld as “symbols of 
peace” where they are expected to intervene in situations of conflict between landowners and tenants. 
This counters the research in other areas which has illustrated that where traditional leaders do not have 
the ability to control land, they will lose the support of their constituents (Ntsebeza, 2005; 14-15). In this 
case study, landowners acknowledge the authority of traditional leaders in the maintenance of peace, 
which is said to be a role they have played since pre-colonial times and hence, a source of their 
legitimacy. 
 
In Chapter 5: A place for chiefs after all, the main findings of the study are restated. It reiterates that the 
legitimacy of traditional leaders is not tied to the control of key resources and/or state given powers, but to 
multiple legitimacies that serve to ensure a place for traditional leaders on the contemporary political 
landscape. Ultimately, it states that the peculiar conditions in kwaMeyi village warrant the development of 
a more extensive research project so as to delve deeper into the workings of authority and legitimacy in 
this locale and further explore its implications for political governance in South Africa and the continent as 













CHAPTER 2: A PLACE FOR TRADITIONAL LEADERS?:  A HISTORICAL 




This chapter explores the roles of traditional leaders from a historical trajectory with reference to the state 
over time. Currently, the South African national government is engaged in a frenzied attempt to find a 
place for the institution of traditional leadership in the context of a democratic dispensation which 
espouses representative governance, equality and non-discrimination.12 This political conundrum harkens 
back to the colonial era where the state extended its powers to chiefs and headmen with the aim of 
controlling, indeed oppressing, indigenous populations in a bid to serve the projects of racial segregation 
and white economic advancement. Since the late nineteenth century, therefore, traditional leaders and 
their respective governments have been engaged in a dialogical relationship that has literally shaped the 
South African political landscape, the major effects of which have been felt by people in the former 
homelands. In light of this contentious relationship, this chapter considers the roles, powers and functions 
of traditional leaders in relation to the various laws and policies that have been enacted to mould their 
governance in the rural areas, briefly focusing on the colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid decades. 
Further, it draws attention to the local responses to traditional and state rule in communal areas, revealing 
an unstable set of experiences across diverse localities in South Africa.  
 
Ultimately, the chapter will show that in considering the vulnerabilities of people in rural areas to 
traditional leadership, the dominant academic gaze has not given enough attention to rural residents 
living on black-owned land that is governed by traditional leaders. This is due to the assumption that 
traditional structures are only present in communal areas and not titled localities. By overlooking this 
peculiar condition, alternative evidence is being left out on the raging debate concerning the legitimacy of 
traditional institutions in an era of democratic governance.  
The beginnings of consensus-free traditional governance: the colonial and apartheid 
disruption 
 
It is widely acknowledged that in pre-colonial times chiefs, and the elder men that formed part of their 
council, governed in a manner that reflected the needs of members of their chiefdoms as opposed to 
                                                 
12 This can be seen by the tabling of various pieces of legislation such as the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Act 41 of 2003, the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004, and Traditional Courts Bill  B15 of 2008 (which was withdrawn and 











ruling on the basis of their own desires and interests.13 Stack (1997: 6) asserts that in pre-colonial Africa, 
traditional leaders “...generally sought to reconcile rather than punish, in a social order based on 
extended kinship relationships in which common interests predominated over those of individuals.” Delius 
(2008: 115) explains that this form of governance was “...consultative, even democratic,” while Omer-
Cooper’s assessment of the Zulu chieftaincy in pre-colonial times highlights that the chief’s powers were 
far from absolute and that he was expected to rule in accordance with general consensus, although he 
ultimately had “the last word” (1966: 17 cited in Williams, 2010: 52).   
 
Writings on the chieftaincy in pre-colonial times indicate that subjects had ways of articulating their 
discontent, especially when chiefs displayed despotic tendencies. As Tapscott (1997: 292) notes, 
“...people showed their disapproval of unpopular chiefs by ‘voting with their feet’, that is, by moving to the 
areas of the more popular leaders [while] in other regions, unpopular chiefs were deposed or killed.” This 
is not to say that chiefs were not supremely powerful. Shaka’s rule is testament to the extent to which 
chiefs were able to command allegiance as much as they were led by consensus. As Williams (2010: 40) 
indicates, the reign of chiefs was a combination of “command and consensus” succumbing to the will of 
his subjects and the advice of his council but also exerting force when his powers were questioned or 
threatened. Nonetheless, it is generally held that traditional forms of governance were more consensus-
based in the pre-colonial era than after the arrival of European settlers, whose presence set the tone for 
decades of despotic governance violently imposed on an unwilling indigenous populous (Delius, 2009: 
218). 
 
With European arrival, consensus-based pre-colonial rule was forever ruptured. In tracing chiefly powers 
from a historical perspective, Delius explains that the image of the chieftaincy had been ceased by white 
officials and legislators where chiefs emerged as despots eroding “...the processes of consultation and 
competition which had been the lifeblood of the pre-colonial order” (2008: 218). In line with this 
assessment, Cousins (2008: 111) ascertains that, “[c]onquest and colonial rule brought the imposition of 
new forms of authority and economic organisation as well as subordination of indigenous forms.” The 
main imposition was the system of indirect rule, a form of governance birthed by the British 
Administration. It was based on the belief that Europeans and Africans were culturally distinct and that the 
institutions of traditional government most suited to Africans were those they had traditionally constructed 
(King, 2004: 65). At the helm of this system were magistrates, especially in the Ciskei and Transkei 
territories which were under the Cape Colony (Hammond-Tooke, 1965; Spiegel, 1990). In this hierarchical 
system of governance, headmen were appointed as the extended administrative arm. Hammond-Tooke 
(1975: 77) describes this as the headmen-system whereby: 
                                                 
13 It is not possible to generalise about pre-colonial African societies given that writings and recordings of this period were carried 
out by a number of colonial agents who were “...outsiders with strong perceptions...limited language capacity and engaged with a 
limited range of informants...usually drawn from the ranks of Chiefs, royals and elders while the views of women, commoners and 
youth tended to be neglected” (Delius, 2008: 212). Hence, the description provided here acknowledges the debate between those 
who view relations between Chiefs as more consensus-driven (Tapscott, 1997) and those who see these relations as despotic 











“The districts themselves were subdivided into locations, approximately thirty to a district, and over each was 
placed a headman, appointed to the post by the administration.... Although, in fact, succession to office was 
almost invariably inherited, in law the headman was appointed by Government and was subject to 
bureaucratic rules of censure and dismissal. The chiefs, as such, were all but ignored.” 
 
The powers of chiefs were thus eroded, although they continued to exercise authority in communal areas 
under a system of cooperative governance with the colonial administration. Further changes were brought 
about with the introduction of the Glen Grey Act of 1894. As Ntsebeza (1999: 21) notes, “...there were 
three major elements to the Act: a change in the nature of land tenure, the establishment of local District 
Councils in the African Areas, and a labour tax.” Essentially, the Glen Grey Act permitted Africans to own 
land under a policy of ‘one man, one lot,’ transforming landholding from a communal system to one of 
individual freehold tenure. Beinart and Bundy (1987) highlight the extent to which a minority of 
‘progressive’ Africans were able to acquire private land while the majority remained in communal areas. 
These reserves remained under the firm control of chiefs, given the distorted understandings of 
colonisers on the role of chiefs as ‘owners’ of the land. The misinterpretation of communitarian principles 
of African landholding became “codified in a way that allowed indirect rule by the state” (Cross, 1991: 77). 
Communal areas became the predominate sites where Africans could access land but only through tribal 
authorities who not only ‘managed’ land allocation processes but also the collection of taxes (Southall and 
Kropiwnicki, 2003: 52).  
 
Chiefly powers were fully restored with the passage of the 1927 Native Administration Act which brought 
chiefs firmly into the administrative system by extending their powers beyond that of headmen. These 
powers were not absolute. The British administration maintained ultimate control via the Governor-
General who acted as ‘supreme chief’ (Bennett, 2004: 109). What is critical is that the Native 
Administration Act provided for chiefs to become judicial officials in the newly delineated tribal areas 
where the Act “…conferred civil jurisdiction on chiefs…” (Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999: 104). Their 
powers were further extended with the passage of the infamous Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 which 
“consolidated chiefly powers in the reserve areas now reconceptualised as ‘homelands’” (Southall and 
Kropiwnicki, 2003: 54). The Council system was abolished and replaced with Tribal Authorities and 
organised at three interrelated levels; tribal, regional and territorial (Ntsebeza, 1999a). Hence, “the 
chieftaincy became assimilated into the architecture of “separate development’’ (Southall and Kropiwnicki, 
2003: 54). The Bantu Authorities Act set the scene for a series of rural revolts, some of which were led by 
dissident chiefs such as the Mpondo revolts of the 1960s (Hammond-Tooke, 1965). The Act was 
expediently accepted by traditional leaders, who were perceived as “collaborators of the colonial masters” 
(Kyed and Buur, 2006: 1). This was seen as giving them more powers to control matters in the reserves in 
a less restricted way than the council system had permitted (van Nieuwal and van Dijk, 1999; Mbembe, 
2001). Abuse of powers by chiefs fuelled popular discontent, and as some argue, signalled the end of 












As a consequence of colonial and mainly apartheid legislation, chiefs emerged as a “clenched fist” ruling 
despotically on an unwilling rural populous in all matters administrative, judicial and executive. Their roles, 
powers and functions are succinctly captured by Mamdani (1996: 23): 
“Not only did the chief have the right to pass rules (by laws) governing persons under his domain, 
he also executed all laws and was the administrator in ‘his’ area, in which he settled all disputes. 
The authority of the chief was thus fused in a single person all moments of power; judicial, 
legislative, executive and administrative.” 
From these historical developments, the view that emerges is that these unanimous sources of power laid 
the basis for despotic rule and spelt the end of rule via popular legitimacy, especially as rural residents 
rebelled across the country. In Bennett’s (1996; 30) view, as a consequence of state action chiefs now 
had “...little in common with his pre-colonial forbearer, for successive governments have intervened to 
appoint and depose rulers, to redefine their powers, and to create or divide tribes [which lacked] an 
authentic or popular basis of legitimacy.” This very sentiment was shared by many observers of the 
African chieftaincy and caused them to anticipate its demise at the dawn of democracy.14  
The democratic era: state-led ambivalence, contested laws and undefined roles 
 
When the African National Congress (ANC) took office in 1994 and led the nation into an era of 
democratic governance, it brought along with it an unwanted but seemingly necessary passenger; the 
historically undemocratic and despotic institution of traditional authorities. Ntsebeza (1999a; 1999b; 2000; 
2008) has undertaken over two decades of research and writing regarding the important yet problematic 
relations between the ANC and traditional authorities which attests to the fact that incorporating traditional 
leaders into the anti-apartheid struggle was a strategic move aimed at expanding the organisations 
support base. He writes (1999a: 84): 
“One of the key strategies of the ANC was to mobilize support against apartheid on as broad a front 
as possible — hence its characterization as a multi-class and multi- or non-racial alliance. In 1987, 
during the dying moments of apartheid, a group of traditional authorities in KwaNdebele who 
opposed apartheid-style independence formed the Congress of Traditional Leaders in South Africa 
(CONTRALESA) and immediately aligned itself with the ANC in exile”.15  
                                                 
14 It must be noted that some chiefs fought against white domination from the colonial period and especially during the apartheid 
years. In fact, as Kessel and Oomen (1997: 562) narrate, some of the founding members of the ANC were Chiefs, and traditional 
leaders comprised a large number of its membership. During the 1950s and early 1960s, some Chiefs spear-headed the rural 
revolts that took place across South Africa, in places like Mpondoland and Thembuland in the Eastern Cape (Ntsebeza, 2005; 
Spiegel, 1990). These Chiefs were ultimately sidelined for more “compliant Chiefs” who worked as an extended administrative arm 
of the state in the control and containment of people in rural areas (Kessel and Oomen, 1997: 534). Since the transition to 
democracy, traditional leaders have tended to over-emphasize the role they played in the anti-apartheid movement. Some scholars 
label this “opportunism” in a bid to secure political power and legitimacy in the democratic era (Ntsebeza, 2005; 1999a; 1999b).  It is 
generally understood and accepted that traditional leaders were mainly compliant with the state.  
15 To maintain their place on the political scene, traditional leaders began to come together as a unified body, CONTRALESA. As 
Ntsebeza (2008) notes, some did so in a bid to distance themselves from ‘illegitimate’ Chiefs who were placed in positions of 
authority by colonial and apartheid structures while ‘genuine’ ones were side-lined by the oppressive state. But in the end, even 












In most of his works, Ntsebeza presents the relationship between the ANC and traditional leaders as 
mutually beneficial. The ANC needed increased support from rural residents who were more closely 
aligned to traditional authorities than they were to the ANC. On the other hand, in the early 1990s, it was 
clear to traditional leaders that the apartheid system was in its last days and the shelter they enjoyed 
under the wing of colonial and apartheid structures would now have to be provided by the emerging ANC 
government. To this end, the two factions battled to find a place for traditional leaders. Once again, the 
law became the primal site of contestation. During the negotiations, traditional leaders fought hard to 
carve a place for themselves in the Constitution while the ANC remained committed to the development 
of democratic structures across the country. In the end, the battle was won by traditional leaders who 
managed to find a place for themselves in the interim Constitution of 1993 and in the final provisions set 
out in the 1996 document. This inclusion “…came as a shock to many observers” (Ntsebeza, 2008: 239) 
and ultimately set the tone for an ambiguous relationship between structures espousing democratic 
governance and the historically rooted traditional governance system (Mashele, 2004). 
 
Evidently, this ambiguous relationship has its roots in the Constitution which is practically silent on the 
roles, powers and functions of traditional leaders. Chapter 12, Section 212 (1) of the Constitution states 
that “[n]ational legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership as an institution at local level on 
matters affecting local communities.”16 In other words, ‘providing a role’ or adding content to the 
constitutional prescription is left up to the legislature. Following this constitutional mandate, the legislature 
has attempted to carve out a role for traditional authorities with dismal consequences. They have done so 
in the form of a series of controversial Acts and Bills, starting with the passage of the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 (TLGF). This was quickly followed by the 
Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004, and then the even more notorious Traditional Courts Bill B15, 
which was gazetted in 2008. Read together, the most alarming aspect of these three pieces of legislation 
is that rural society once again falls under the centralized power of officially recognized traditional leaders 
in the vein of their colonial and apartheid predecessors, with little or no room to opt out of this form of 
governance. These pieces of legislature were greeted with fervour by most traditional leaders who 
coveted a return to the days of autocratic rule. Conversely, the decrees were met with outcry by land 
practitioners, civil society and activists at large who recognized that they were, at their very core, anti-
democratic and oppressive.  
 
The first of these Acts, the TLGF Act of 2004, reinvigorates the controversial Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 
1951 which deems that ‘traditional councils’ are to govern in the tribal areas set in ethnically separate 
traditional areas, this despite “the reality of intermingled and ever-changing rural identities” (Love, 2008: 
xiii).17 These very traditional councils were set to take over land administration in ethnically separate 
                                                 
16 In general this entire section makes no recommendations on what functions are to be served by traditional leaders save to 
mention that they have a role to play in the observation of ‘custom’ in their various communities (see ibid 15).  











communal areas under the Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) which came to pass a year later. The 
CLRA sought to entrench the power of traditional leaders in the control of land in the communal areas 
instead of in the hands of elected land administration committees as had been the case in earlier versions 
of the Bill (Claassens, 2008: 264). The fact that rural residents would only acquire land through the 
administration of traditional councils led to a challenge from four potentially affected communities, namely 
Kalkfontein, Makuleke, Makgobistad and Dixie. As a result, on May 2010, the Constitutional Court 
declared it unconstitutional in its entirety, especially given the process that Parliament used to force the 
Act through in the wake of 2004 elections.18 Within four years, government attempted, yet again, to 
centralize power in the hands of traditional leaders through the Traditional Courts Bill. Among other 
disturbing precepts, the Bill bars people appearing before the traditional courts, manned by ‘traditional 
councils’ from representation by lawyers. In essence, such laws are “…in conflict with the constitution’s 
protection to the right to representation of criminally accused persons” (Mnisi, 2006: 6).  
 
For women, these pieces of legislation are likely to undo decades of gender equality. A gender analysis 
reveals that they are likely to reinforce patriarchal power relations or “official rural patriarchy” which sees 
traditional institutions actively oppress women as legitimized by discourses of tradition, custom and 
African culture (Walker, 1994: 355). In terms of composition, traditional councils are likely to be male 
centred, even if the TLGFA mandates that thirty-per cent of the Council should be composed of women. 
Power dynamics and local politics are likely to influence this process negatively and advance customary 
views of women as secondary citizens.19 People living in rural areas are likely to be governed on the 
basis of custom, which is often interpreted in ways that are disadvantageous for women. As Walker 
(2001: 11, cited in Cousins, 2007: 299) explains, “…the interpretation of ‘customary law’ by colonial 
administrators and magistrates served to strengthen not weaken, patriarchal controls over women and 
freeze a level of subordination to male kin (father, husband, brother-in law, son) that was unknown in pre-
colonial society.” Under these proposed and promulgated laws, women are likely to be further silenced 
and made evermore dependent on men for their livelihoods.  
 
When evaluated collectively, it is clear that these set of laws will have several devastating consequences 
for rural residents. They will re-enforce colonially disputed so-called tribal boundaries, entrench 
patriarchal gender relations and centralize power and authority in the hands of appointed traditional 
councillors without options for rural residents to opt out. In this way, rural people are again taken as 
second class citizens, more akin to rural ‘subjects’ of traditional rule, than full citizens of a democratic 
nation in the manner famously described by Mamdani (1996). People living in rural areas who opposed 
the Communal Land Rights Bill in 2003 expressed the feeling that it was an “…expression of 
government’s intention to dump its responsibility towards rural people…a way of backing out of 
government’s responsibility to sort out the mess and provide services to rural people” (Claassens and 
                                                 
18 Information Newsletter of the Law, Race and Gender Unit, Law, Custom and Rights, July 2010.  
19 Already, there are reports that the election of traditional councillors, both men and women, has been a failure in the North West, 











Ngubane, 2008: 181). The research undertaken by some scholars indicates that some rural residents do 
not wish to return to the times of oppressive rule at the hands of traditional leaders. They perceive them 
as exploitative and unresponsive rulers and the antithesis of democracy. However, recent research 
reveals that in other localities traditional leaders in a more positive light and that governance under 
traditional leadership is reducing rural vulnerability, rather than causing it, especially for women (Logan, 
2011). 
Contemporary Experiences of traditional leaders: a mixed bag of benefits and 
disadvantages 
 
The contemporary experiences of traditional rule by those living under their jurisdiction can only be 
described as a mixed bag of benefits and disadvantages. The previous section reveals that rural 
residents are not in favour of laws which (re)cast ‘traditional authorities’ as the exclusive and primary 
conduits of social services who are tasked with allocation of land in their areas. But in most studies which 
elucidate this, people in rural areas explain that traditional leaders should remain a visible part of the local 
governance structure. There is a small minority of rural residents that appear to be benefiting from 
traditional rule, or at least, capable of shaping custom in ways that generate more beneficial relations and 
outcomes. Reporting on the findings of their research, Claassens and Ngubane (2008) give voice to the 
varying realities experienced by people living in rural areas. For instance, “[i]n Batlharos in the Northern 
Cape, a traditional leader said land was also being allocated to single mothers.... At Mpindweni in the 
Eastern Cape, women said unmarried mothers had to struggle to get be allocated land, and if they 
succeeded then the latter was allocated in the name of a male relative” (Claassens and Ngubane, 2008: 
169). 
 
The findings of this research indicate that processes of change are underway in rural areas across the 
country, albeit amidst challenges. In other localities, traditional leaders are not putting up as much of a 
front as they contend with the demands of rural people, thereby shifting customary practice so that it 
takes on a more democratic character. Cousins’s (2011) work in the Mchunu and Mthembu tribal areas of 
Msinga, KwaZulu Natal points to similar kinds of transformations in the practices of traditional leaders in 
relation to land allocation and the provision of other social services in the area. His findings indicate that 
single women can now be allocated land to establish their own homesteads. Secondly, that those who 
have partners but were not married could be registered and receive land. Both are innovations that run 
counter to customary practice (2011: 1). Describing this as social change characterised by the changing 
reality of land relations, Cousins (2011: 58) explains that “...in 2009, the Mchunu Traditional Council 
decided to allow land to be allocated to single people, including women. In 2010 the Council also decided 













These changes do not take place without friction. Similar to the findings of Claassens and Ngubane 
(2008), Cousins (2011) explains that social changes such as these are marred by anxiety and tension. 
Even though these practices are moving towards the inculcation of equality in society, locals are 
discontent with the extent to which the institution of marriage is being broken down because traditional 
councillors are issuing land to single and unmarried people. The breakdown of marriage in this manner is 
not seen as befitting the moral order of the community. Locals are calling that traditional leaders act in 
accordance with local understandings of tradition as opposed to democratic principles of equality. Even in 
such cases where traditional leaders are acting in ways that promote the democratic principles of 
equality, it is the locals that call for a return to traditional conceptions of marriage. Hence, in order to 
maintain their legitimacy, traditional leaders are constrained by the expectations of their communities.  
 
Bank and Mabhena’s recent publication, Bring back Kaiser Matanzima? Communal land, traditional 
leaders and the politics of nostalgia (2011), bears testament to the ways in which people in rural areas 
are actively in favour of traditional authorities and more so than democratically chosen officials. At the 
behest of the Department of Land Affairs, Bank and Mabhena conducted a study in the Eastern Cape to 
examine whether or not rural communities in this area were ready for the implementation of the now 
repealed Communal Land Rights Act. One controversial finding was that “...traditional authorities 
remained firmly in control of rural allocation across communal areas in the Eastern Cape, and that most 
rural households believed they should continue to play a dominant role in land allocation” even though at 
the household level they expressed a need for more permanent individualised title (Bank and Mabhena, 
2011: 121) . Although the paper is unclear in terms of which communities in the Eastern Cape held such 
views, they report that in the area of local governance, locals reserved the most severe criticism for 
elected officials who were seen as “self-serving, disconnected and corrupt” while “chiefs and traditional 
authorities, by contrast, were viewed in a much more positive light, as potentially helpful, consensus 
seekers, and desirable intermediaries in community development” (2011: 121). The authors contend that 
most informants seemed to be calling for a return to the days of Matanzima’s rule within what the authors 
have termed as a ‘politics of nostalgia,’ which is “essentially a response to social exclusion and the 
difficulties people face in connecting to the state and each other”. (Bank and Mabhena, 2011: 139) This 
blinds rural residents from recognising how their lives have in fact improved, for example, through the 
introduction of social grants. Despite such views, which are mostly held by older informants, the failure of 
the state to provide adequately has fuelled local residents’ perceptions that things are better under 
traditional governance. However, this fuel is lit by the present reality of incompetent and disconnected 
leadership of elected officials prompting “grassroots popularity of traditional leaders” (Bank and Mabhena, 
2011: 132). 
 
Questions concerning the popular legitimacy of chiefs and their incumbents formed the basis of an Africa-
wide study undertaken by Afrobarometer (2011) over the last four years.20 According to Logan (2011: 20): 
                                                 
20 The research was carried out in Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 











“Those who insist that traditional leaders do not enjoy popular support appear to be missing the core reality 
on the ground: in almost all of the countries studied, solid and at times overwhelming majorities of Africans 
affirm that traditional leaders continue to play an important role in their societies, and that this is desirable. In 
sharp contrast to the assessments of these analysts, people want more of their traditional leaders, not less.” 
[emphasis in the original] 
 
Conferring with the findings of Bank and Mabhena (2011), Logan (2011) highlights that the popular 
support some traditional leaders appear to be enjoying can be attributed to the ineffective leadership of 
democratically elected officials. Furthermore, what is particularly striking, and not well emphasized in 
other research, is the fact that the character and moral standing of the individuals in leadership positions 
goes a long way to ensuring their legitimacy. It appears that the body of scholarship aimed at exploring 
the resilience of institutions of traditional governance is missing the high value that rural residents 
attribute to the content of a leader’s character as befitting the moral ethos of a community.  
The missing narrative: traditional authorities on freehold land 
 
Recent scholarship has brought into sharp focus the contemporary views and experiences of people 
living in communal areas. Surprisingly, along with the narratives which tell of corrupt chiefs exploiting the 
powers they have maintained in post-apartheid South Africa, are discourses that show chiefs and 
traditional leaders as socially transformative leaders, responding to the needs and vulnerabilities of their 
constituents. This variety is a direct result of the diversity of the institution itself and its highly variable 
manifestations across a multitude of localities in South Africa. It reveals that the institution of traditional 
leadership is not a homogeneous entity; neither are the people it governs.  
 
The focus on traditional governance in rural areas is of critical concern, not simply because of the 
potential traditional leaders possess to rule undemocratically under the guise of customary law, but 
because their authority affects approximately 15 million South Africans living in the communal areas 
where they govern.21 These are the areas where people spend most of their daily lives subjected to 
traditional rule, their families and descendants having been forced to live there by the colonial and 
apartheid projects of segregation and exclusion. Communal areas of the former homelands are therefore 
conceived of as the traditional areas of customary rule, obscuring another reality of rule by chiefs on black 
owned, privately held land since colonial contact, a condition that reflects “the rarity of freehold titles that 
have survived in African areas over the long term” (Kingwill, 2008: 184). This omission has caused 
researchers to conclude that “...in the areas where chiefs rule, there is no individual freehold title; instead 
people occupy their land with the consent of the chief” (Williams, 2010: 8; see also Budlender et al, 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
21 The statistics on exactly how many people live the former homelands vary. Fast Facts 2011 states that there as 15 million people 
living in former homelands, while Claassens and Mnisi (2009) put the figure at 17 million. Murray (2004: 3) attributes this to the fact 
that people who live in rural and urban areas continuously traverse these two ‘zones’ making it difficult to uncover who spends their 











The relationship between landed Africans and chiefs has for the most part escaped the focus of academic 
research. 
 
This is not to say that this obscure reality was altogether overlooked by scholars. The late eighties saw 
the publication of seminal works dealing with the peculiar condition of African landownership. Beinart and 
Bundy’s (1987) critically acclaimed and influential account on the politics and popular movements in the 
former Transkei offer one of few in-depth historical accounts into the development of African freehold title 
from a historical perspective. Of particular relevance to this study is the fact that “...by the 1900s, 
Umzimkhulu must have been one of the Cape districts with the largest area of private land in African 
ownership at the time” (Beinart and Bundy, 1987: 51-52). Africans who could amass the buying fee for 
land did so. Elite Africans who had benefited from colonial aspirations to develop “...a class of African 
farmers along white lines” (Ntsebeza, 2005: 58) were able to purchase land and establish themselves as 
headmen in their own right by settling immigrants and thus “assembling large numbers of followers 
around them” (Spiegel, 1990: 60). Chiefs followed the same processes in a bid to cement their powers, 
taking advantage of the emerging land market to purchase land and settle their own people, thereby 
broadening the base of their followers. Hence, private land became recommunalised and ordinary rural 
residents became subjects of chiefs and landowners, a circumstance that continues to bear weight in 
Umzimkhulu to this day.  
 
While Beinart and Bundy’s book provides much needed historical insight into the emergence of freehold 
tenure in Umzimkhulu, it does not adequately comment on relations between chiefs and landed Africans. 
For this, one must consider other scholarly contributions which do not focus on the district of Umzimkhulu 
but attempt to uncover chief-landholder relations, although not in a detailed fashion. Two years prior to 
Beinart and Bundy’s seminal work, Moll (1985) published his doctoral thesis entitled Transition to freehold 
in the reserves. In it, he explains that as a result of the Glen Grey Act of 1894 and due to various policies 
aimed at developing more individualised tenure, the next four decades formalised land tenure “patch work 
fashion” in all the magisterial districts of Ciskei, seven western districts of the Transkei, and even two 
districts in Natal (Moll, 1985: 3). Furthermore, Moll explains that the provision of freehold and in some 
cases quitrent tenure resulted in a series of social differences, especially between people under 
communal tenure who remained more dependent on their chiefs and those that did not. He noted that 
chiefs were generally against the introduction of quitrent tenure which threatened their authority (Moll, 
1985: 4). Given that the main focus of his paper was to consider the effects freehold tenure on agricultural 
output, the roles, powers and functions of chiefs in freehold land was also not fully explored. Cross and 
Preston-Whyte (1987), however, pay more attention to issues of authority and tenancy on what they term 
the ‘black freehold areas’ of Natal. The authors examine the relationship between landowners and rent 
tenants more closely although they too pay scant attention to the role of chiefs in such a situation, which 
they argue was fraught with tension and conflict. Altogether these works provide critical insight into the 
development of black freehold areas from a historical perspective but leave out the experiences of black 












The more recent examples on relations between chiefs and their ‘subjects’ on privately owned land 
comes in the form of Ntsebeza’s seminal work Democracy compromised: chiefs and the politics of land in 
South Africa (2005). It is the only South African example of an in-depth, historically rooted study on the 
relationship between chiefs and the people they govern on land that is not ‘communally owned’ and 
vested in chiefs. It bears witness to how landowners in the district of Xhalanga violently resisted the 
chieftaincy because they did not have to depend on it for their source of livelihood, including land 
allocation. This research affirms the hypothesis that, where traditional leaders are without powers to 
allocate land or control vital resources, their authority and popular legitimacy is greatly weakened 
(Ntsebeza, 2005; Ribot, 2001; Shipton and Goheen, 1992). While numerous parallels can be drawn 
between this study and others looking at the relationship between landed Africans and traditional 
authorities, it considers this in the context of quitrent and not freehold tenure. For this, one must consider 
a study undertaken by Kingwill (2008) which looks directly at the relationship between traditional leaders 
and African landowners. 
 
Focusing on the villages of Rabula and Fingo, Kingwill’s study sheds light on the relationship between 
African landowners and chiefs in Rabula and Fingo villages respectively, although a full, independent 
publication of her findings have not yet been made.22 Nonetheless, her analysis indicates that even 
though headmen in this area have no decision-making powers in regards to land allocation, in Rabula, 
“..there is currently a great deal of support among residents and owners for headmen to be reinstated...to 
manage the commonage over which title-holders struggle to enforce some measure of control, and also 
re-establish a direct link with regional or central government, widely believed to have been compromised 
under the municipal system” (2008: 193). Taken as a whole, these studies point to the necessity to 
examine more closely the particular experiences of Africans living in the few titled localities of the former 
homelands, especially in relation to traditional authorities that govern in these areas. This study hopes to 
provide a glimpse into the ways in which chiefs and headmen constitute their authority and legitimacy in a 
context where they have no powers to control land.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that traditional authorities have maintained a stronghold over rural areas as a 
direct result of state polices, laws and legislation. From colonial times through to present day, their 
legitimacy has been, and indeed continues to be, drawn from the actions of the state. For the most part, 
chiefs and headmen took on the powers conferred on them with minimal resistance and hesitation, 
choosing instead to profit from the provisions made for them to control their subjects through such 
systems as the land allocation processes. When the ANC took power in 1994, the general expectation 
was that there would be an end to the exploitative institution and that there was to be a transition of rural 
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residents from subjects into citizens. Instead, traditional leaders have received a new lease on life 
through the post-apartheid state, a place made for them once again through a series of controversial 
legislature. Most of these laws have not been enacted given the unwavering outcries from civil society 
and rural-based organisations who recognise that they are undemocratic, patriarchal and reposition rural 
residents as second class citizens. What is ironic and contradictory is that while some rural residents 
passionately call for an end to chiefly rule, others express growing need for it to take on a more active 
role in local governance structures, especially in preference to elected officials. This is because the 
institution is a heterogeneous one, governing in diverse localities that are shaped by the needs of rural 
residents in line with their moral order.  
 
The findings of recent scholarship indicate that there is more to the chieftaincy than serving as agents of 
the state. The fact that they are present in freehold areas where they have no state conferred powers to 
control land, which usually forces rural residents to show their allegiance, demonstrates that they have 
other sources of legitimacy. To date, the academic gaze has not focused significantly on these freehold 























CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE  
OF CHIEFS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: AN 
EXPLORATION OF PERFORMANCE LEGITIMACY 
Introduction 
 
Since the transition to democracy, the South African government has made a commitment towards 
extending democracy and development to the long neglected rural hinterlands of the country. This has 
caused people living in rural areas to have greater expectation concerning service delivery and 
development in these areas (Ntsebeza, 2005; 2008; Williams, 2010). Hence, development, or lack 
thereof, has become a critical part of the overall “legitimising process” (Buur and Kyed, 2006: 1). This 
chapter examines the extent to which traditional authorities maintain authority on the basis of 
performance legitimacy, which is concerned with the manner in which political leaders exercise power in 
the control of resources and how those in society evaluate this process in terms of service delivery and 
development (Williams, 2010: 28). This chapter highlights that residents of kwaMeyi expect development 
to be carried out in a way that fits the moral order of their community, illustrating that it is the behaviour of 
political leaders that ultimately positions them as legitimate political authorities. This chapter draws 
attention to the fact that even in cases where state officials have enough capacity to generate resources 
and services for local people, who they are as leaders matters as much as what they do. 
Uncovering the local governance structure in kwaMeyi 
 
In order to examine how traditional authorities and state officials serve in the areas of development as 
well as in the provision of services, it is necessary to map out the structure of local government in 
Umzimkhulu district, with particular reference to the village of kwaMeyi. Hence the following sections 
explore the character of traditional governance in KwaMeyi and that of local government in the district. 
The peculiar rise to power of chief Mavana in kwaMeyi 
In terms of a traditional governance structure, KwaMeyi village falls under the jurisdiction the Mvolosi 
Traditional Council which was headed by chief Mavana.23 Chief Mavana presided over kwaMeyi village 
for sixteen years, from 1994 until his death in 2010. Born in 1960, he was a university-educated man, an 
activist during the apartheid struggle, and up until his passing, was chief over 13 villages in the 
Umzimkhulu district. He was also as an avid farmer who had a preference for growing organic food.24 His 
                                                 
23 Attempts to ascertain the composition and make up of this council were met with difficulty.  
24 Interview with Chief Mavana, July 2009, Umzimkhulu Municipal Offices. It should be noted that the quotations that are being used 
in this thesis are written word-for-word so as to aptly capture the views and sentiments of their authors. These quotations are 











rise to the position of chief is a unique and unusual story and one that needs to be elucidated in order to 
understand the functions of traditional leaders in kwaMeyi village. 
 
As noted earlier, chiefly rule has been prevalent in kwaMeyi village and the wider district of what is now 
Umzimkhulu since its very formation in the late 1800s. In this area, the historical emergence of the 
chieftaincy is particularly peculiar, mainly because it is uncharacteristically a titled locality and not a 
communal area where chiefs normally have their jurisdiction. During an interview with chief Mavana, he 
explained how traditional authorities came to govern in the area of kwaMeyi and the wider district of 
Umzimkhulu with reference to his own rise to the position of chief: 
…As time went by it was discovered that Umzimkhulu had plenty of land or farms. Chiefs here in 
Umzimkhulu came about because they bought farms. The chief would buy land, people would then live on 
his land and then he would be the chief. It was discovered that the chief couldn’t understand the things on 
the farms. It was decided that there should be chiefs, as in my case, who is democratically chosen to look 
after the farm people since they were voiceless.25 
 
Chief Mavana’s account attests to the history of land ownership by traditional leaders highlighted in the 
introduction of this thesis. To reiterate, it illustrates that the entrenchment of the chieftaincy took place in 
tandem with the spread of private land ownership in Umzimkhulu and confirms the arguments of such 
academics as Ntsebeza (2005: 14-15) who state that “the question of the legitimacy of traditional 
authorities is very much associated with their position in and control of land allocation process.” Unlike 
other situations where land was vested in chiefs by the state, traditional authorities in Umzimkhulu took 
advantage of the land market to become landowners themselves through the purchase of land from the 
Griqua and white settlers respectively. This land became the support base for chiefs, housing their own 
subjects in addition to any immigrants who wished to reside there. Baba Steven, a seventy-five year old 
farmer corroborated this in an interview: 
 
Tanya: Do you know of any land in Umzimkhulu that is considered communal land and is governed by the 
tribal authority. Do you know the history of how that came about and what’s happening there now? 
Baba Steven: You see for instance, Clydesdale just behind us. What happened there, the chief there of the 
Bhaca’s. They got together as men and decided to go buy a piece of land as settlement of their subjects. Now 
it is called now communal land 
T: But they hold the title? 
B.S: They have got the title.26 
 
By taking advantage of laws extending title to Africans, chiefs were able to provide residential space for 
their ‘subjects’ to the extent that land became communal, or recommunalised in the fashion described by 
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Beinart and Bundy (1987).27 Chief Mavana and his family have been purchasing farms in this manner for 
a time, his father having bought farms over his life time, encouraging his children to do the same. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to determine which sites these were within the district of Umzimkhulu, or 
establish whether or not chief Mavana governed these areas as a chief wielding authority over his 
‘subjects’; if he was acting as a landowner, charging rental fees to tenants without enforcing recognition of 
his chieftaincy, or even, the extent to which tenants were labour-tenants contributing their labour to 
agricultural output on his farm. In areas other than kwaMeyi village, I was unable to determine whether or 
not his rule was a consequence of these factors.  
 
What must be emphasized and is of critical importance and of particular relevance to this thesis is that 
chief Mavana did not own land in kwaMeyi village or control allocation practices in any capacity. 
Furthermore, in kwaMeyi, chief Mavana had no authority to allocate residential sites. By his own 
admission, chief Mavana confessed, “I have no authority to allocate sites here in kwaMeyi. The owner of 
the farm is the one who allocates the site.”28 Even without powers to control land allocation practices, 
chief Mavana presided over kwaMeyi village as its chief and was consulted by local residents in this 
capacity. This reality contradicts the widely-held view that the legitimacy and longevity of traditional 
authorities is mainly based on their powers to allocate land, which compels “...rural residents, willy-nilly to 
cooperate with traditional authorities...” (Ntsebeza, 2005: 22). This goes against the arguments of 
scholars such as Shipton and Goheen (1992, 314) who note that “control of land is a central part of 
political leadership...can prop up a leader’s political power and authority and help define them.” It appears 
that for traditional leaders in the village of kwaMeyi, controlling land is not central to their authority.  
Chief Mavana, a democratically elected chief? 
The existence of a traditional authority on privately held land is but one peculiarity in kwaMeyi village. The 
second peculiarity concerns the notion of a “democratically chosen” Chief as mentioned previously by 
Chief Mavana who said, “...It was decided that there should be chiefs, as in my case, who is 
democratically chosen to look after the farm people since they were voiceless.”29 Another kwaMeyi 
resident, Gogo Liza, a 73 year old former member of the traditional authority, seemed at pains to 
emphasize the fact that chief Mavana was an elected chief, having gained political office through an 
electoral process and not through hereditary means as is common practice: 
 
It’s me who entered Mavana in that role. I was chief Twala’s secretary. I had seven years as chief Twala’s 
secretary. They shot him and he was also diabetic. Then we had to go to the Magistrate to ask for a new 
chief.  We had to advertise the post. I was helped by this man who told me that Mavana had many degrees, 
in Human Resource. Mavana was ideal because he had degrees. He passed. We wanted someone who 
                                                 
27 The process of recommunalisation is explored further in Section IV of this chapter. 
28 Interview with Chief Mavana, August 2009, Umzimkhulu Municipal Offices (my emphasis). 











had no criminal record and sober habits. He must be educated and religious. Mavana passed easily 
because he had 70% or 80% vote. He still thanks me to this day.30 
 
Gogo Liza’s comments demonstrate that chiefs can be elected through democratic processes and not 
only through hereditary means. It has already been noted that the ideology of democracy has resulted in 
significant changes in the structure and character of the institution of traditional leadership to some 
degree (Cousins et al, 2011; Claassens and Ngubane, 2008). If chief Mavana was indeed “democratically 
chosen”, it greatly contradicts a central contention within the academy that chiefs cannot be voted into 
political leadership roles, that “...in so far as the institution of traditional leaders is hereditary, it cannot be 
transformed and democratised” (Ntsebeza, 2005: 33). This case study on kwaMeyi village seems to 
indicate that individuals can hold a place as ‘chiefs’ through an electoral process and not through 
hereditary means as is customary. Chief Mavana presents himself, and is presented, as an ‘elected Chief’ 
one without previous chiefly connections.  
 
Ultimately, discussions with older informants have provided insight into the peculiar circumstances which 
led to Mavana gaining office as inkosi over kwaMeyi village, in addition to twelve others in the 
Umzimkhulu district. In some of the villages in Umzimkhulu, he presides as chief because he owns the 
land in which large numbers of people live. This privately owned land has become recommunalised and 
as a result, its residents show allegiance to the chief. This is in keeping with the assertions of academics 
and researchers who tie chiefly authority to their powers to allocate land. However, in kwaMeyi village 
specifically, chief Mavana has no authority to allocate residential sites although he is recognised by 
villagers as presiding chief and forms part of the local governance structure. Furthermore, it appears that 
chief Mavana is an ‘elected chief,’ one that was voted into power through a democratic, electoral process. 
These peculiar circumstances force one to consider other avenues, besides land allocation, that facilitate 
the continued presence of traditional authorities in kwaMeyi village.  
The expansion of local government in kwaMeyi and the role of traditional authorities and ward 
councillors 
Once cannot explore the authority and legitimacy of traditional leaders without paying attention to the 
structure of local governance as a whole. As South Africa entered into an era of democratic governance, 
one of the central projects undertaken by the post-apartheid government was that of rural development. 
The rural hinterlands, once labelled as homelands or Bantustans, were little more than cheap labour 
reserves, serving the needs of bourgeoning agricultural and mining industries. People living in these 
areas had suffered decades of underdevelopment and economic neglect which manifested in on-going 
rural poverty.  
 
                                                 











To mitigate this crippling poverty, several laws and policies were introduced. The Constitution of 1996, the 
highest law of the land, provides that local government structures be created in addition to national and 
provincial levels of governance. Together with the White Paper on Local Government, the main goal of 
this third tier of government is to act as a developmental local government. It’s aims will be “...to 
democratize local government, by introducing the notion of elected representatives even in rural areas, 
but also to transform local governance, with a new focus on improving the standard of living and quality of 
life of previously disadvantaged sectors of the community” (Ntsebeza, 2004: 8). Municipalities serve as 
the main institutions orchestrating this development in their localities, fulfilling the constitutional mandate 
that municipalities be established throughout the country and especially in rural areas as contained in 
Section 151 (1). 
 
To this end, the Umzimkhulu Local Municipality was established in the year 2000.31 It caters to the 
developmental needs of the townships and villages in the entire district including the village of kwaMeyi. It 
describes one of its strategic priorities as being “…to develop systems to facilitate co-operative 
governance and inter-governmental relations especially with the district, other spheres of government and 
service providers to maximize the development impact within Umzimkhulu Municipality.”32 The 
municipality also strives to extend good governance and citizen participation through its “fully functional” 
Ward Committee system.33   
 
At the time of research, the entire district was broken up into 18 wards, each headed by an elected Ward 
Councillor.34 KwaMeyi village fell under Ward 11, which was then headed by councillor Jonathan “Magic” 
Mkhize.35 The municipality also makes a concerted effort to work with traditional authorities across the 
district. In their 2008/2009 annual report, they stated that they “…have also worked hard to improve our 
relations with traditional leaders. Traditional leaders have been very supportive in issues of service 
delivery in our municipality.”36 This assertion indicates that traditional leaders are a visible part of the local 
governance structure in the area and that they are included in service delivery and development projects. 
It also speaks to a difficult relationship between state officials and traditional leaders, one which is 
explored further on in this chapter. 
 
From the evidence shown here, it is clear that kwaMeyi village is overseen by an institution of traditional 
authority, headed by chief Mavana as well as the Umzimkhulu Municipality, headed by councillor 
Jonathan ‘Magic’ Mkhize for Ward 11. This dualistic pattern of governance has been described as a 
                                                 
31 See Provincial Notice 344 of 2000, published in Provincial Gazette 5563 of 2000, as amended by Provincial Notice 1 of 2006, 
published in Provincial Gazette 6456 of 5 January 2006, issued in terms of section 12 of the Local Government: Municipal 
Structures Act, 1998 (Act No. 117 of 1998);  
32 Umzimkhulu Municipality Annual Report 2008/2009 
33 Umzimkhulu Municipality Annual Report 2009/2010 
34 This has since increased to 21 wards. 
35 There are now 20 wards and a new Ward Councillor 











nested, multi-layered system of governance which has become characteristic of the post-apartheid 
political landscape in South Africa as well as elsewhere on the continent (Cousins, 2011; Kingwill, 2008). 
This kind of structure, with its multiple levels of authority, causes tension and confusion for residents of 
kwaMeyi, especially in the area of development. 
Development, chiefs and ward councillors: a complex situation 
Underperformance of Ward Councillors and the municipalities 
The issue of development is a sore point for rural residents across South Africa. The same can be said 
for residents of kwaMeyi village. Informants explained that the levels of development in Ward 11 
appeared to be taking place at a much slower rate than other wards in the district. It seems that the ward 
system has caused tension across the district of Umzimkhulu, as people compare and contrast the 
differing levels of service delivery and infrastructural improvements. Thembi, a 33 year old single mother 
explained that there were places “...where things are happening and in other places or wards where they 
are not.”37 There was a pervading sense that the ward system, and particularly the Ward Councillor 
“Magic”, was not effective in the extension of development, such as repair and creation of roads, 
provision of electricity and piped water. However, there was some recognition that development, though 
perhaps sluggish, was taking place at a far better rate than when Umzimkhulu was part of the Eastern 
Cape. For much of the twenty-first century, residents of the district participated in protests and made 
numerous calls to government requesting to be transferred from the province of the Eastern Cape to that 
of KwaZulu-Natal.38 When this plea was finally granted in March 2006, development began to take place, 
or so the residents perceived. As Hugo, a soldier aged 33 explained: 
 
With regards to the development in Umzimkhulu, the complaints will always be there but honestly things 
won’t happen and progress simultaneously. As you can see here at kwaMeyi, we are just sitting waiting for 
electricity to be installed. We have been waiting for a while. Places around kwaMeyi have electricity, where 
the holdup is, I really don’t know. Perhaps the people who represent this area are not doing their jobs.  
However, if you look at Umzimkhulu in its entirety there is development occurring. Perhaps it’s because we 
have been listed under the KwaZulu-Natal Province. I remember when I was younger; there was nothing but 
bushes and empty land. Now there is a taxi rank, shops like Rhino and Barnett’s. Since we have been listed 
under KZN, the development of roads has occurred. There is development it’s just that it is taking time.39 
 
While the comment above reflects an acknowledgement of developmental improvements since the 
provincial switch, they allude to a general dissatisfaction with development at the hands of “the people 
who represent this area” who are perhaps “not doing their jobs.” KwaMeyi residents were particularly 
vocal about their expectations of ward councillors and the displeasure they felt on their perceived 
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38 Daily News “Billions Spent on improving Umzimkhulu” 8 September 2008. 











underperformance and that of the municipality in general. Gogo Noma, 70, a retired teacher and wife of a 
landowner, was very clear about who was to blame for the slow pace of development: 
 
Gogo Noma: Even the ward councillors, they are here to give us water and electricity, put in the roads. But 
they don’t do that! We don’t have electricity. 
Tanya: They don’t?  Why is there no electricity? 
Gogo Noma: It’s our ward councillor. The blame is with our ward councillor. Even now we are not sure if it’s 
coming.40 
 
During fieldwork, it was evident that Jonathan “Magic” Zulu, Ward Councillor for kwaMeyi village, was not 
warmly regarded by the locals. This was largely attributed to his inability to bring in development at a 
suitable pace, in addition to being unavailable to assist community members in need. “Magic” was often 
described as someone who could never be located, a realisation I came to after failing to secure him for 
an interview. Whether or not he performed his duties effectively, very little could be achieved without 
consulting “Magic” as the following narratives reveal: 
 
1. Sakhile: Who is ward councillor for kwaMeyi? 
Thembi: It’s… I don’t remember, I know that he is a Zulu though. Apparently his name is Magic. Don’t 
know whether that’s his real name or what. 
S: Oh so you have seen him? 
Thembi: Yes, I have seen him 
S: Where have you seen him? 
T: I went to go ask for a letter to open an account. That’s who we ask. 
S: What account? 
T: A bank account, even if you want a letter to go apply for the grant for the child. That is where you go. 
S: So you don’t ask this from the chief? 
T: No, you get it from Magic. 
S: So, if you would go to the chief and ask for this, they wouldn’t take it? 
T: I don’t know, but all I heard is that if you want a letter to apply for a grant and an account you must go 
to your councillor.41 
 
2. Sakhile: What does Magic help you with? 
Diane: Since we get the grant for children, we go get a letter/book from the councillors then he does it for us. 
You get a folder that he assists you with, and then you go to Home Affairs with forms that are completed by 
the councillor. 
S: Can’t you go to the chief’s headsman? You see there’s the chief and there’s the councillor right. Why 
don’t you go to the chief to help you? 
D: There wasn’t a form that required me to go to the chief. There were two forms that needed to be filled in 
by the school and the councillor. 
S: The form stated that you go to the councillor? 
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D: Yes, it states on the form that one must go to the councillor and the school.42 
 
From the narratives above, it is evident that Ward Councillors play a critical role in ensuring that rural 
people can access key services and resources tied to ‘formal institutions.’43 Formal institutions, such as 
banks and even the Department of Home Affairs, have drawn municipal officials into the processes that 
facilitate service provision and development in rural areas. It appears that chiefs and traditional leaders in 
the area are operating outside of this formal arena, thus contradicting assertions that “while chiefs are 
weak, one cannot achieve anything without consulting them” (email conversation with Jesse Ribot as 
quoted by Ntsebeza, 2005: 20). Instead, in the provision of key services and the extension of 
development, Chiefs are hardly being consulted. On this, Gogo Liza made the following remark: 
 
The life at kwaMeyi presently is still the same even before we voted. It’s a pity because other places 
developed and they got water and electricity. Another thing that went wrong in kwaMeyi before we voted 
was that we had projects we were working on. However when the municipality was involved nothing seemed 
to happen.44  
 
According to Gogo Liza, the traditional authority which she served and c ntinues to align herself with, 
worked more efficiently in bringing development to the area. In her time, they had a clearly defined 
developmental role. Her sentiments are a testament to the fact that traditional authorities have a far 
smaller role to play in the area of development and the provision of key services and resources than 
before “the vote” in 1994. In this context, it appears as if the state has failed to provide clear roles and 
functions to traditional authorities. It has only paid lip-service to the authority the institution by enacting 
various laws and bills such as the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003. It 
has introduced elected representatives through the Municipal system, but has actually decreased the role 
played by chiefs in the area of development.  Chief Mavana elaborates that this lack of clarity on the 
roles, powers and functions of traditional leaders has caused a great deal of confusion, tension and 
anxiety, especially in relation to Ward Councillors operating in the same areas: 
 
Sakhile: As the chief over Meyi, Bisa and Thembeni. We found out that there is a ward system by the 
municipality. Now we are not quite sure where… 
Chief Mavana: That’s so confusing my children. It is a mixed masala. I have 13 villages to look after. There 
are three councillors. Some of the other places have a chief as well, so there’s an overlapping. There are 
councillors and chiefs- it’s conflicting in a way.  
  S: Their responsibilities and your responsibilities overlap or? 
C.M: Some overlap and some clash. There are personality clashes, some people are complex. For instance, 
there is one of the issues that one of the councillors has. Usually councillors and chiefs work together. For 
example, a death certificate needs to be completed by the councillor but not the chief even though the chief 
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43 In this thesis, formal institutions are defined as “…those backed by the law, implying enforcement of rules by the state” (Cousins, 
1997; 4-5). 











knows the people better. Councillors stay on their positions for five years and therefore they don’t know the 
community. I have been in this role for 16 years and don’t know all the people of kwaMeyi. But how much 
more a person who is in a role for five years?45 
 
Chief Mavana’s comments express a deep realisation that the powers of traditional authorities are 
dwindling at a practical level. In kwaMeyi village they are not being relied upon to extend development, 
nor are they being recognised as authorities by ‘formal institutions’ such as banks despite 
acknowledgements by that state that they are a valuable and important part of the post-apartheid era, 
democratic era. In terms of possessing the potential to control resources or bring about development, 
traditional leaders have very little powers in which to do so. Baba Steven highlights this point succinctly: 
 
These days their role seems to be fading off I am telling you. Even through the government, you find you 
listen more to the councillor than you would listen to your tribal authority. Like for instance if you go to the 
bank you need a residential address, you must have a residential address you go to the councillor not the 
chief. Now, you go to the council and they would do it for you. But even Mavana he does but it done by the 
councillor. But councillor is more recognized than the chief. That is why always find that there is this debate 
in the parliaments about the tribal authority, these chiefs and all that...It’s not, let’s just say it’s KZN. Say 
KZN. You always hear in this culture saying Amakhosi (chiefs), speaking about Amakhosi (chiefs) fighting 
with the ANC that they are stripping powers from the Amakhosi (Chiefs). That is why culture is dying. That is 
why you can see they are slightly stripping off the power slowly. They are gently doing that. You find that 
there will be no Amakhosi in this area. There are councillors. At Umzimkhulu, we have these chiefs at 
Umzimkhulu; we have one Gugwini- Zethuse-we are talking about Chiefs not induna (headman)-we have 
Slahla. We have Chief of the Bacas, we have Mbovini. At these Chiefs areas you find that there is a 
councillor, okay? There’s a councillor, and now the prominent people who bring development to the Chief’s 
area is the councillor. So the people are more inclined to shift to the councillor because he is the only person 
who speaks to the mayor or the managers. The Chief has nothing to do with it. He tells his people what the 
municipality says: ‘It says this and that.’ ‘The chief doesn’t bring water. I would bring you water.’ They have 
stripped these people of power. One day you are no longer the chief. Then you not respected because the 
chief doesn’t bring anything to their people.46 
 
According to Baba Steven, traditional leaders are losing authority because the state is slowly, “gently” as 
he puts it, stripping their powers. The introduction of ward councillors, more directly drawn into 
development projects and formal institutions has had the effect of turning chiefs and other traditional 
leaders into little more than figure-heads within the structure of local government. While some informants 
argue that ward councillors tend to be ineffective in bringing about development, Baba Steven’s 
comments illustrate that the buck stops with these state officials because “the chief doesn’t bring anything 
to the people.” As he explained, “the prominent people who bring development to the chief’s area is the 
councillor.” If indeed kwaMeyi village, is the “chief’s area” as Baba Steven described, the assumption that 
development cannot take place without their cooperation does not hold here. What stands out from his 
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comments is that whoever controls resources maintains political authority and this control is a central part 
of establishing political legitimacy. However, Williams (2010: 28) reminds us that “...in the long-term, 
legitimacy must be based on something more than performance...” In other words, there are other 
sources of legitimacy to consider. 
Establishing authority through performance legitimacy 
 
Baba Steven’s view, as previously quoted, is not representative of other sentiments on the importance of 
traditional leaders in local government. For some residents, things would be better if chiefs had more 
control over resources as was the case before the advent of democracy and the introduction of 
democratic institutions. Similar to the findings in the study by Banks and Mabhena (2011: 133), rural 
residents in kwaMeyi appear to be engaged in a “politics of nostalgia” where people look back to the 
periods under traditional rule as “better times.”47 Enette, a 49-year-old teacher, displayed irritation at the 
fact that ward councillors were doing the same jobs previously assigned to traditional leaders, and at that, 
doing the job inadequately. Enette firmly believes that traditional authorities are preferable to state 
officials as she explains in the following narrative:  
Sakhile: What is the difference between the councillors and the headsmen, the older ones? 
Enette: It’s just government wasting money on people. It’s like here at kwaMeyi. You know that there is a 
councillor called Magic. Magic has plenty of assistants who then deal with the people when Magic is not 
available. I am used to the assistants (sponda). The term councillor is a recent development. 
S: Is there something that the councillor can or cannot do that the assistant (sponda) does or vice versa? 
E: For me, their work seems the same because if there is something like someone passing away...an 
example is when my sister passed away. She passed away here at home. They told us to get a letter from 
the chief. I asked whether the councillor’s letter will work. Clearly they do the same work. I think it’s just that 
the government has a lot of money to waste. They pay the councillor and they pay the chief. Do you know 
that the chief gets paid a lot of money?  
S: But the councillors get paid too? 
E:  Yes, and I think they should choose one person that they pay. 
S: Which one do you prefer, the chief or the councillors? 
E: I prefer the chief, the councillors are a dream....When we had a discussion with him when people started 
getting sick as a result of the road. We asked him why he hasn’t fixed this road. He said it is the first priority 
this year and he hasn’t done anything. I once heard a radio advert saying that, ‘Councillors are always 
promising to do things.’ That’s all he does, promises. All the things that were done for Bisa were done by 
Jwara who was the previous councillor for the Bisa location. There is nothing you can point and say it was 
done by Magic. There isn’t even one thing that Magic has done. The water was installed even before Magic 
was around, it was done by Jwara. That is why I would say that it probably would be better even if the 
councillors didn’t exist. When there weren’t any councillors and the old men of the community were working 
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served by the ANC than the TNIP.” They explain that what may be driving this nostalgia is worsening socio-economic conditions on 
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for us and they had a sound mind. Well I don’t know how to put it, maybe it’s because of the way Magic is. 
He just cruises up and down the streets with his car and the young girls. He loves these young girls. You will 
find him with girls of 12 years just chilling. He is first class!48 
 
Enette’s arguments tap into recent debates on the resurgence of traditional leaders in the era of 
democracy. They indicate firstly that traditional authorities continue to draw some degree of popular 
legitimacy as a consequence of poor performance by state officials such as ward councillors. Even if one 
accepts that the incapacity of the state is due to crippling neo-liberal economic policies and overall 
declining global socio-economic conditions, this is not the case in kwaMeyi village. It is clear that ward 
councillors have control over resources and that the Umzimkhulu Municipality is well-funded with capacity 
to meet many of the developmental challenges in the district.49 What one sees through Enette’s 
assertions and the narratives of other informants takes us beyond the weak-state hypothesis.   
 
Her statement indicates that drawing legitimacy is significantly influenced by the character of those in 
leadership positions, in as much as it ties to their ability to control key resources, or in this case, bring 
about development. This fits Williams’s (2010: 29) assertions that “political actors must make decisions 
consistent with both the underlying moral and performance dimensions to remain legitimate at local level.” 
It is not enough to bring in development if your leadership style is one that does not fit the moral order of 
that particular locality. For Enette, she is not comfortable with the introduction of new norms and 
institutions such as ward councillors and the municipal system. To reiterate, she states that “I am used to 
the assistants (sponda). The term councillor is a recent development”.  Beyond this, Magic’s behaviour is 
deemed inappropriate because he is accused of fraternizing with underage girls. Hence, ward councillor 
Zulu is not viewed in a positive light because of his perceived immoral behaviour. Local people assert that 
he does not really know the people of Umzimkhulu or care about their concerns.  Conversely, chief 
Mavana is cast as someone who knows community members intimately and gives weight to their needs 
and concerns in a manner that reflects the values, norms and rules of this particular society. Therefore, 
the different ways these two political leaders carryout their duties is what legitimizes their authority. It 
shows that controlling critical resources can legitimise the authority of a political leader but only in so far 
as their exercise of power is deemed appropriate and fitting with local norms and values, in what has 
been described as performance legitimacy.   
                                                 
48 Interview with Enette, July 2009, at her home in kwaMeyi. It must be noted that Enette lives in the township of Ibis, referred to as 
Bisa, and comes once or twice a month to see to her rural home which is permanently inhabited by her  mentally challenged older 
sister and is tended to by a domestic worker. 
49 The 2009 Umzimkhulu annual report states that it received R22 million rand to repair roads in the area but only repaired roads 
totaling 30km. During the time of research, informants complained that these so-called repairs were partially complete and reported 
that development of roads had since halted as funds had “gone missing.” The claims made in this report appear to be exaggerated 
(see report http://www.umzimkhululm.gov.za/Umzimkhulu%20Municipality%20Annua...pdf ). The Umzimkhulu Municipality has had 
defend itself, numerous times, against allegations of corruption (see Business Day 













This chapter has shown that chief Mavana had no authority to allocate residential sites and that he 
operated outside of the formal arena in the provision of services or development. If kwaMeyi villagers, like 
Thembi, needed letters to apply for bank accounts, they went to ward councillor “Magic.” If they needed 
letters to apply for social grants, as Diane did, they went to ward councillor “Magic”. This contradicts 
arguments within the academy that “…while chiefs are weak, one cannot achieve anything without 
consulting them” (Ntsebeza, 2005: 20). Even though ward councillor Magic is able to bring in some level 
of development, the manner in which he does so, and the way he conducts himself generally, is viewed 
as repugnant to the moral order of kwaMeyi villagers. He is described as being unavailable when needed 
and a corrupt individual with questionable morals. On the other hand, chief Mavana is upheld as an 
engaged leader; one who is ever present to meet the needs of his constituents. He leads in a manner that 
is more familiar, unlike the ward system which is a “recent development,” as Enette explained.  
 
The development of the long neglected rural hinterlands is a burning issue in South Africa, and this is no 
different in the village of kwaMeyi. Development, or lack thereof, is seen as a critical part of the overall 
“legitimising process” (Buur and Kyed, 2006). However, for kwaMeyi residents, controlling critical 
resources does not translate into political authority. Chief Mavana was considered a legitimate authority 





















CHAPTER 4: THE  
ROLE OF CHIEFS IN THE AREA OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN 
EXPLORATION OF MORAL LEGITIMACY 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3, it became apparent that political leadership is not defined by a leader’s propensity to bring 
in development or control critical resources but on the manner in which they exercise the powers that 
have been conferred upon them. Hence, their legitimacy is based upon their ability to act in ways that 
reflect the moral order of the community where they govern. This chapter delves more deeply into the 
moral aspect of political legitimacy by exploring William’s notion of moral legitimacy as it applies to 
kwaMeyi village. Moral legitimacy highlights a particular society’s worldview, their “...norms, values, myths 
and symbols used to define and evaluate ‘appropriate’ political action” (Williams, 2010: 21). One aspect of 
this worldview is the belief that chiefs are symbols of unity, tasked with maintaining peace and harmony 
since pre-colonial times (Logan, 2011; Williams, 2010; Oomen, 2005 and 2000) This ideology is noted in 
the study of kwaMeyi, where chief Mavana is upheld as a purveyor of justice and a political leader who 
maintains peace in the context of difficult relations between landowners and tenants.  This chapter will 
show that the idea of chiefs as symbols of unity continues to legitimise their authority in rural areas such 
as kwaMeyi.  
‘Community-making’ in kwaMeyi village 
 
As detailed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, kwaMeyi village is a titled locality where the land is 
owned by a small number of individuals.50 This form of landholding has persisted since the late 1800s 
when the Griquas obtained legal ownership through the Glen Grey Act of 1894 which was later sold to 
prospective white and African farmers as well as ‘elite’ Africans. Due to the difficulty of farming (attributed 
to poor geological conditions and inaccessible markets) landowners begun to subdivide their land into 
smaller parcels, renting them as a means to generate income (Beinart and Bundy, 1987: 51). A system of 
rent-tenancy emerged which continues to operate in kwaMeyi presently. Thus, it is landowners who are 
responsible for land allocation in the village of KwaMeyi and not chiefs or traditional authorities as is the 
case in other localities across South Africa (Claassens and Ngubane, 2008). I have named this process a 
system of “community-making” as it is connotative of the how landowners, through rent-tenancy, have 
created the community of KwaMeyi. The term rent-tenancy does not highlight the fact that landowners 
engage in a process of inclusion and exclusion where they decide who can and cannot rent a portion of 
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their land, and therefore become part of kwaMeyi society. It is a process that needs to be explored which 
answers a call put forth by Cross and Preston-Whyte (1987, 1) that “freehold and tenancy are closely 
connected, and the relationship needs to be fully debated in its local significance.”  
Tenants and enduring rights to land? 
 
It has been constitutionally recognised that tenants, particularly labour tenants, are among the most 
disadvantaged groups when considering the tenure security of historically displayed people in South 
Africa. Narratives of exploitation and oppression at the hands of despotic landowners, mostly farmers, 
have been the focus of much research and writing on tenure security in South Africa. In kwaMeyi 
however, tenants at first appeared to be enjoying secure tenure.  For between fifty and a hundred and fifty 
rands per year, tenants in the area can reside there indefinitely, having opportunity to construct homes on 
the parcels of land allotted them by landowners. Unlike their urban counterparts, tenants in this area are 
described as having ‘enduring rights’ to live on the land of titleholders, from one generation to the next. 
Thembi, whose parents moved to live on the land owned by the Zulus when she was a child, explained 
that there were no problems between her family and their landlords stating that “...we all live together 
well. There’s no problem.”51 Enette, whose brother is a landowner had this to say on this form of 
intergenerational residence: 
 
Sakhile: The people who build on your land, once they have children, do they just live in the same house? 
Enette: Yes, they just live in the same house. However, at times when they have to move out of their 
parent’s house they will have to pay. Other than that, they just live in the same house forever. It’s a nice 
living. I know it’s not like that in the town/city. 
S: Are there people who have left? 
E: People who have built and left? There were Sotho people who came here and built. They came from 
Lesotho and there were many of them. Then they left and went to go work in Strathoek. The Sotho people 
don’t like anything that has to do with building, that’s what I saw, because they just left their building half 
done. It started to break down as result of the wind. 
S: You didn’t remove it? 
E:  No, we didn’t demolish the house. They will return when they want to. We kept on asking them. When 
another job opportunity came up in another area, they moved from Strathoek and went there.52 
 
Enette’s comments display the form of tenancy in kwaMeyi that allows residents to make homes on 
landholders land for indefinite periods of time, residing on it “forever”, to the extent that even when they 
leave for prolonged periods, the structures that they will have erected remain untouched, left to decay by 
the hands of nature. This sentiment is shared by tenants as well. So confident are they in the 
permanence of this form of tenancy that some, with permission from landowners, build houses of brick 
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and stone “family homes” belonging to close kin. The value and importance of the family home is 
encapsulated by Hugo’s comments. He explains: 
People think this is my house since I built it however it’s not my house. This is a family home. My 
brother and I discussed the idea of building a house for our mother...My mother stays with her 
older aunt in Durban. Most of my uncles and aunts have left to go find work elsewhere so there is 
no family home.53 
 
From this narrative, tenants not only enjoy enduring rights as individuals but for current and future kin 
relations. Once one is granted permission to live on a demarcated piece of land, it is theirs forever and 
their lineages become a part kwaMeyi for generations to come. However, beneath the rhetoric of 
enduring rights to land, rent-tenants were, in actuality, not particularly secure. In as much as they spoke 
of having "no problems" with their landlords, in practice tensions and conflict between landowners and 
tenants meant that at some point their security of tenure was threatened, sometimes even to the point of 
eviction.   
Landlords and tenants: tension, conflict and vulnerability 
Landholders, tenants and even the chief were all reticent to reveal, in detail, the challenges and tensions 
of the tenancy system in kwaMeyi. Informants were particularly vague about evictions that have taken 
place in the past or the circumstances that led to them. Nonetheless, discussions with residents of the 
area were sufficient enough in detail to indicate that these l ndowner-tenant relations were fraught with 
difficulty. Diane’s narrative is indicative of the tensions of living on “other people’s land” as she explained: 
 
You know what is tricky here is that we live in other people’s land whereas in the other places they have 
land of their own. Here there is no such thing. For example, if you are a group of women who would want a 
place to stay we could ask the government to give some land to build on. Instead here we have to go ask 
people to live on their lands. We would like to ask government to help us. It’s hard, but it would be lovely to 
ask the government to do that. But we need to start asking from a person.54 
 
Even with the promise of e during, intergenerational rights to tenure on privately held land, tenants like 
Diane expressed strong desire to live on land that belonged to government rather than on privately held 
land in the hands of individuals. Her statement confirms that tenure security is not as secure as 
informants attempted to convince me.55 As Diane continued to narrate, struggles between landowners 
and tenants are often centred on the payment of rent. Even though fifty to a hundred and fifty rand per 
annum may seem like a negligible amount for a year’s rent, in an area that is severely impoverished, 
characterized by unemployment and dependence on state-sponsored social grants, paying the monies is 
no easy feat. For rent tenants, not paying could lead to some degree of harassment. This was clearly a 
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source of worry for Diane who expanded by saying that “…every July I need to pay that money…I would 
sacrifice my last money to pay for it. Even if I don’t pay for it someone comes through and keeps on 
reminding me to pay.”56 Non-payment of rent is one cite of conflict between landowners and tenants. 
 
From the landowner’s perspective, tenants posed numerous problems as well. All of the landowners 
interviewed suggested that tenants were causing problems in the area. Without pointing fingers at 
themselves directly, landowners explained that the practice of community–making had populated 
kwaMeyi village with ‘criminal elements.’ Unlike chiefs in communal areas, title holders were allowing 
people from outside to live on their land without ‘checking’ their character first. On communal land where 
chiefs or indunas (headmen) allocate residential sites, the prospective resident is expected to produce a 
letter of ‘good character’ from the traditional authority in the area where they had previously resided, 
which proved that this particular person was of good standing. But because the traditional authority in 
kwaMeyi has nothing to do with the allocation of land in this titled locality, landholders are now tasked 
with this responsibility. And it is one that not all title holders are fulfilling, as Enette explained: 
 
But there was something we used to do way back in time. Here at this farm, we used to ask for a testimonial 
from your former chief that will inform us what type of a person you are in order to avoid what is happening 
in kwaMeyi. We don’t know the reason you left the other place. Before we used to ask for a testimonial. 
Perhaps, you were rude or you got chased away because of witchcraft. Now people just take their monies 
without enquiring what type of a person they are allowing to build on the land. That is perhaps why we have 
so much crime here because we have gathered all these people. We just ask for their money and they just 
build here.57 
 
Informants believed that because of the monetary aspect of community-making, landowners were not 
being cautious in the selection of prospective occupants. Hence, rent-tenants were being blamed for the 
high incidence of crime and violence in the area. In general, they were viewed as a nuisance, making life 
in kwaMeyi “a living hell”58. In instances where tenants were seen as being particularly problematic, 
landlords would intervene, some to the point of evicting them. When asked whether or not he had heard 
of cases where landowners have evicted tenants, Baba Steven confessed that he himself had done so: 
 
Tanya: Have you heard of incidences where people have been evicted from their land or in a quarrel? 
Baba Steven: I did 
Tanya: You did? 
Sakhile: What where the circumstances? 
Baba Steven: This guy was born and brought up here. He grew and now he started stealing and he messed 
up uMakoti, women. He was fiddling with young women while men where in Joburg working the mines. So 
this came to me in reports. We warned him not to do it. ‘Now get out, we no longer need you because of 
A,B,C,D’. Eviction is difficult because you can’t evict an innocent somebody but you can somebody who you 
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have sleepless nights over him. A good reason, so that you take him to the Magistrate. So we cannot stay 
with such an animal here, make it go away we don’t need him.59 
 
Baba Steven’s narrative is indicative of the status of landowners in kwaMeyi. As a farm-owner, he 
presides over his tenants as though he himself a chief, dealing with the problems of ‘his’ people. Those 
whom he judged to be of questionable moral character, as was the case with the man described above, 
faced eviction. This is similar to other research which illustrates that landowners on freehold areas share 
attributes of chiefs or indunas in that they are increasingly consulted by their tenants for help in solving 
various problems (Cross and Preston-White 1987, Kingwill, 2008). However, it is this very status which 
can be used to act in ways that threaten the land rights of tenants, especially given that the relationship 
between landowners and tenants is characterised by unequal power relations. Landowners tend to be 
elites-with a certain level of education, money and social capital. They wield more power and authority, 
and have a high social status as compared to rent-tenants who are often poor, uneducated and 
unemployed, and ultimately voiceless. Interviews with informants suggest that they do not know their 
rights as tenants under the law. If a person is accused of a crime, how does that person defend 
themselves and in what manner? Surprisingly, in the village of kwaMeyi, whenever tensions arise 
between landowners and rent-tenants, it is traditional leaders who act as intermediaries, giving voice to 
the needs of rent tenants.   
Chiefs and the protection of tenants land rights 
As stated previously, informants were reluctant to provide specific details on the vulnerabilities of tenants 
as a result of the actions of landowners, especially in regard to evictions. Nonetheless, it became clear 
that eviction, or at least the threat of eviction, was a common problem in kwaMeyi. When asked to 
elaborate on this, Chief Mavana had this to say: 
  
Tanya: Do you actually deal with cases such as the Zulus kicking out a tenant and the tenant wants to 
complain? 
C.M: I do try to assisting resolving such cases. 
Tanya: Are there such cases? 
C.M: Yes, there are cases like that. 
Tanya: What would be the situation? 
CM: The owner of the land thinks that I can just dismiss a person like that. But there are certain things they 
must do. He lives there for more five months, then the tenant has a right. The law says if you move the 
person, you must organize them a place to go. 
Tanya: Customary practices or which law? 
C.M: Law, tenant’s law...Someone would say, ‘I don’t want that person.’ Then I would say, ‘Go to any court 
of law, no-one would just allow you just evict someone.’60 
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Chief Mavana’s confirmation that eviction is indeed a problem attests to the tenure insecurity narrated by 
informants that live “on other people’s land.” On a secondary level, his statement brings to light the 
importance of traditional authorities as purveyors of justice. To fulfil this function, chief Mavana appears to 
have had a firm understanding of tenant rights under the law, one that he has used to defend vulnerable 
tenants who faced eviction by landowners, thereby preventing landowners from being able to “just evict 
someone” as he said. While informants were at pains to identify the role of traditional authorities in the 
area of local governance and development they were crystal clear on the role of the chief as a purveyor of 
justice as these two narratives indicate: 
 
1. Sakhile: So if people get chased out of their place would that involve the chief? 
Thembi: It should involve the chief because it will need to be discussed. 
 
2. Sakhile: Is there a place in the whole of Umzimkhulu where a place was given by the chief? 
Gogo Liza: No, they belong to the person who owns the place. He doesn’t tell the owner where their 
tenants should build their land. He doesn’t get involved. He only gets involved when there is conflict 
between the tenant and the landlord. 
 
From these narratives, it is evident that even without powers to allocate land, chiefs wield enough 
authority and legitimacy to intervene in situations of conflict. They are recognised and revered as such by 
landowners who have no real impetus to respect their authority because they do not control land or 
critical resources which in essence create relations of dependency (Ntsebeza, 2005: 11). While 
recognising that chief Mavana had nothing to do with the provision of land for settlement in kwaMeyi, 
Enette, a landowner’s sister admitted that chief Mavana was an important part of dispute resolution in the 
village: 
 
Sakhile: Now things have changed, as you have said, there is nothing that involves Mavana here? 
 Enette: Yes, there is nothing that involves Mavana, but if there is a problem here for example if a person 
has built a house here and doesn’t want to pay. The case will first go to the chief’s headman. Bhuti Sgege, 
the head of the Damoyi family will be taken as the Damoyi representative then the case will be discussed. If 
the case cannot be solved then it will go to the chief. That is why I am saying that we are not dependent on 
him however there are cases where he gets involved.61 
 
From her testament, it is apparent that traditional leaders are embedded in the process of conflict 
resolution. First headmen are consulted and when resolutions cannot be made, the chief intervenes. 
Whether landowner or tenant, there is acknowledgement that traditional leaders are integral to conflict 
resolution in the area, operating within a shared moral order, which is congruent with other literature on 
the roles of traditional leaders. In the research conducted by Afrobarometer, it was found that, “ with their 
particular knowledge of community histories and traditions, as well as, in many cases, of the individuals 
involved, traditional authorities are often regarded as much better suited for handling dispute resolution 
                                                 











and conflict management than formal organs of the state such as the police and courts, or local councils.” 
For Berry (2002: 655) traditional leaders facilitate discussion and reconciliation by creating “spaces for 
negotiation” within a shared cultural framework.  
 
Hence, if the chief is at the centre of such negotiations, then this is evidence that he employs some 
authority and legitimacy as an arbiter of justice. Statements such as the one provided by Enette indicate 
that while chiefs may not be “depended” upon by landowners for their livelihoods, they wield enough 
authority to intervene in situations of conflict. The following account by Gogo Liza reveals that even if 
landowners would prefer to have nothing to do with chiefs and other traditional leaders, they nevertheless 
recognise and respect their authority: 
 
Sakhile: And in terms of the tribal authority like chiefs and stuff, do they have a role to play? 
Gogo Liza: No, they don’t at all because we are the landlords but the chiefs stick their nose to the people on 
the farms. But they don’t. Because the tenants are under the chiefs we just turn down our heads and say, 
“Okay, Okay”. But they are not supposed to interfere.62  
 
Gogo Liza’s comments attest to a certain degree of respect for traditional leaders in the area, specifically 
the chief, even if traditional leaders “stick their nose to people on the farms” as she narrated. In general, 
landlords appeared to distance themselves from chiefly rule and authority, Baba Steven having given a 
lengthy monologue in Chapter 3 attesting to the fact of their diminishing powers; Enette explaining that 
“there is nothing that involves Mavana” while in this instance, Gogo Liza noted that they don’t have a role 
to play with regards to landowner or in her words, landlords. Despite this, their authority cannot be 
discounted; when it comes to dispute resolution they are recognised as legitimate authorities, even if this 
is done with some degree of reluctance. This may relate to the fact that traditional leaders are seen to 
fulfil a more historically rooted mandate which casts them as “symbols of unity” which is the belief that 
traditional leaders are better at maintaining peace and harmony as they have done since pre-colonial 
times (Williams, 2010: 27). It is an ideology that is evident in kwaMeyi, even among landowners. Enette 
captures this articulately: 
 
….They (chiefs) look after the peace within the community. The chiefs even looked at the crime within the 
households. Now, here there used to be house where the boys from kwaMeyi used to rob and steal 
electrical appliances. If the chief was still overseeing the community he would have investigated. But now 
the councillors would say go to the police it’s not my problem. Then you get confused because the robbers 
are boys from the community. All that is needed is an investigation because people talk especially in social 
areas such as shebeens. The councillors just cruise around in their cars whereas the chief is within the 
community. Even if he cannot investigate himself, he will send his headsmen to investigate and they would 
be his eyes ears within the community.63 
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Again, drawing comparisons between the role played by the chief and his headmen and that of ward 
councillors, Enette is alluding to what can be seen as the primary function of the chieftaincy: that of 
peacekeeping. Ward councillors are again noted to be doing an inferior job of maintaining peace because 
they are not “within the community” like traditional leaders are. From Enette’s narrative, it appears that 
peacekeeping is being usurped by Ward Councillors, which is preventing the extension of justice and 
equally the maintenance of peace. Even as a landowner, it is evident that she sees traditional leaders as 
peacekeepers, and therefore legitimises the institution of traditional authority within this particular moral 
order. To reiterate, it is a view held by both landowners and tenants, who contend that the chief’s role is 
“...to maintain peace amongst people, to maintain harmony.”64  
Establishing authority through moral legitimacy 
 
Bearing in mind that moral legitimacy is concerned with the “...norms, values, myths, and symbols of the 
society that are used to define and evaluate ‘appropriate’ political action, it is clear from the responses of 
kwaMeyi residents that traditional leaders are morally legitimate because they act as “symbols of unity” a 
role that is described as having pre-colonial roots.  It is comparable to the findings in Afrobarometer which 
show that  “…it is chiefs’ role in resolving local disputes and managing communal conflict...that makes 
them indispensable in the eyes of community members” (Logan, 2011: 4). This is reflected in chief 
Mavana’s statement that peacekeeping is function based on shared cultural understandings of how things 
ought to be resolved: 
 
CM: In our (African) traditional culture, for example if we fighting and swearing at each other with the Moyos, 
we might even hit each other, we will need to realize that this will cause danger and we will need to solve it 
amicably. Whereas if there is no chief, the chief is there to correct us and let us know that ‘Dlamini, you were 
wrong here and there.’ If there was no chief, the Moyos would have gone to the magistrate and I probably 
would be arrested for grievous bodily harm. I would pay a fine. We would remain enemies with the Moyos. 
There nothing that would happen so that there is forgiveness.65 
 
The idea that “the chief is there to correct us” is one that appears relatively uncontested in the village of 
kwaMeyi. Because he is viewed as a symbol of unity, and behaves in a manner that has benefit for the 
whole community, chief Mavana and other traditional leaders are morally legitimate and therefore, 
legitimate political authorities. Furthermore, his role as a symbol of unity is seen as an aspect of what he 
describes as “our (African) traditional culture”, which continues to be a frame of reference for residents in 
kwaMeyi. In the same manner that there are democratic norms and values that espouse freedom, 
equality and human rights within a democratic constitutional order, notions of tradition have ideological 
value. Despite the distortions of African culture as a result of the warped interpretations of colonial and 
apartheid administrations, the articulation of custom continues to have relevance to a multitude of people 
in South Africa. The idea that African culture predates colonial contact and that chiefs are custodians of 
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that culture, continues to be the main source of legitimacy for chiefs during this democratic period. 
Despite the controversy that undercuts claims to tradition or “retraditionalisation” (Oomen, 2005: 1) it is 
evident that for local populations they legitimise the authority of chiefs.  As Williams (2010: 25) cautions, 
“…we cannot fully appreciate the current debates over the chieftaincy, or the nature of its authority, 
without an examination of these traditions and myths, whether they turn out to be ‘real’ or ‘imagined.” 
Ultimately, the notion of African tradition and culture has ideological value which contributes to 
assessments of good governance and effective leadership. 
Conclusion  
 
Tenure insecurity continues to pose a challenge to the national project of land reform in South Africa. The 
focus of state efforts at alleviating this are pointed towards persons living on farm lands and in communal 
areas under the jurisdiction of chiefs. In dealing with the latter category, land practitioners have revealed 
traditional leaders to be exploitative, oppressive rulers, curtailing rather than extending the rights of their 
‘subjects.’ Peculiarly, in the case of kwaMeyi, the chieftaincy appears to be doing just the opposite. 
Despite an ethos of enduring rights to land, where tenants are expected to live on landowners land ad 
infinitum and without threat of eviction, the reality is that eviction is a looming possibility. Here, tenants are 
subject to the decisions made by landowners who are solely responsible for ‘community-making’ which 
entails processes of inclusion and exclusion when considering who can live in, and who should, leave 
their land. If a tenant is judged to be criminal, or of questionable moral standing, they have little social 
status or capital to protest, and often lack the education or knowledge of their rights under the law. The 
unlikely hero of the story in kwaMeyi is the chief and his headmen who, in their role as purveyors of 
justice and the related function as maintainers of peace, are able to enter into spaces for negotiation so 
that tenants’ rights are protected. In line with Logan (2011: 4), the evidence presented indicates that “…it 
is chiefs’ role in resolving local disputes and managing communal conflict, rather than, or in addition to, 
their control over land that makes them indispensable in the eyes of community members.” On this basis, 
chiefs are morally legitimate, exercising power in a manner that reflects the ideology of local residents. In 
their eyes, chiefs do a better job of maintaining the stability of the community than ward councillors who 
are less accessible. By acknowledging the centrality of this function for rural residents in kwaMeyi and 
elsewhere in the country and on the African continent, one arrives at a deeper understanding of the 

















CHAPTER 5: CONLUSION-A PLACE FOR CHIEFS AFTER ALL 
Chiefs as politically legitimate 
 
This thesis has explored the roles and relevance of traditional authorities in the context of a democratic 
dispensation which aims to entrench a system of governance by elected representatives. It examined the 
linkage between what traditional leaders do and the question of their popular legitimacy. Popular 
legitimacy is “...a popularly accepted claim to leadership and authority” (Wright, 1994: 3-4).These 
questions were answered on the basis of fieldwork conducted over a period of a month in the village of 
kwaMeyi, Umzimkhulu district. What began as a study which sought to examine the dynamics between 
the chieftaincy and women in terms of land allocation practices, transformed into a study highlighting a 
peculiar condition: the presence of traditional authorities on individually owned land. In contrast to the 
arguments of scholars like Ntsebeza (2005) who provide examples of an imposed chieftainship in areas 
like Xhalanga, research in kwaMeyi indicates that traditional leaders are a valued political entity, 
respected especially for the important role they play in dispute resolution.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, existing literature details the nature of traditional authorities as it pertains to 
their jurisdiction in communal areas, or the former homelands where they exercised the greatest authority 
over Africans. In such places, traditional leaders have been drawn into the project of ‘indirect rule’ since 
the beginning of the colonial era where they operated as agents of the state. As (Mamdani, 1996: 23) 
famously noted, their “…authority was like a clenched fist…” characterized by “…forced labour, forced 
crops, forced sales, forced contributions and forced removals.” The devastating consequences of their 
rule on Africans has been thoroughly researched and documented. However, as I demonstrated in this 
thesis, another reality has not been thoroughly examined. The academic gaze has given scant attention 
to the character of traditional governance in titled localities; especially in relation to landowning black 
Africans. While the studies of Moll (1985), Beinart and Bundy (1986) and Cross and Preston-Whyte 
(1987) have provided some insight into the emergence of African landholding from a historical standpoint, 
they have paid little attention the dynamics undercutting relations between landed Africans and chiefs. 
Ntsebeza’s study of Xhalanga is only one of few in-depth explorations of this dynamic, although his 
contribution focuses on people living under quitrent and not freehold tenure. While this work allows one to 
gleam some of the tensions of landowner-chieftaincy relations, it is not an example of how they emerge 
on freehold land where landowners have full legal ownership of land. For this, one must rely on the work 
of Kingwill (2008) in her study of Rabula and Fingo villages respectively. This study suggests that even in 
freehold areas where chiefs do not control land allocation practices, chiefs and headmen are an important 











research. Hence, in this thesis, I have illustrated that the academy needs to pay more attention to the 
workings of the chieftaincy in titled localities so as to better understand how traditional leaders maintain 
authority and legitimacy in spaces where they have no powers to control land or critical resources which 
are often described as the basis of their authority. 
 
As a way to understand the roles and legitimacy of traditional leaders in freehold areas this thesis made 
use of William’s multiple legitimacies framework (2010: 17). Questions concerning the authority and 
legitimacy of traditional leaders have been addressed by such scholars as Williams (2010) To better 
understand the longevity of the chieftaincy, Williams (2010: 17-18) proposes the multiple legitimacies 
framework, which posits that  
“...in South Africa, there are multiple sources of legitimacy that all leaders-chiefs as well as elected officials-
can use to justify their rule. Each of the different sources of legitimacy offers people a particular set of 
symbols, values, political principles, institutions, rules and processes that are central to the ruler-ruled 
relations and interactions.” 
By identifying that there are different sources of legitimacy, Williams (2010) takes the debate beyond the 
oft repeated assertions that chiefs are legitimate only through powers extended to them by the state and 
the control that they exercise over critical resources such as land. In kwaMeyi, the opposite appears to be 
true: chiefs and headmen exercise authority without controlling critical resources and are upheld as 
legitimate leaders, preferable even to elected officials within the local governance structure.  
 
Similar to the findings of research undertaken by Logan (2011) and Williams (2010) this thesis has shown 
that traditional leaders are resilient because their authority is drawn from different sources of legitimacy 
and not only state legitimacy or the legitimacy that is derived from controlling land and other important 
resources. In Chapter 3, I considered the performance dimension of the multiple legitimacies approach 
which concerns the performance of traditional leaders in the area of service delivery and development. 
This chapter illustrated that counter to assertions that “...development cannot not be achieved without 
consulting traditional leaders...” in kwaMeyi village this is not the reality (Ntsebeza, 2005: 20). Traditional 
leaders are revealed to be powerless in the control of critical resources and in the area of service 
provision. Ward councillors like, Jonathan “Magic” Mkhize, have access to municipal budgets to be used 
for development and are at the centre of service delivery where they assist residents of kwaMeyi in 
opening bank accounts and accessing social service grants. Even though informants report that things 
have changed for the better, they expressed dissatisfaction with the municipal system and councillor 
Magic in particular. Many felt that governance under traditional leadership produced more benefits for the 
community than the ward system has since its introduction. Chapter 3 demonstrated that even without 
powers to control resources, chief Mavana was upheld as an engaged leader because he worked in a 
manner befitting the moral order of kwaMeyi, unlike ward councillor Magic, who was of questionable 
moral character, possibly corrupt and generally inaccessible. In this chapter, I presented evidence which 
demonstrated that while controlling critical resources can legitimise the authority of a political leader to 












In Chapter 4, I examined the other dimension of the multiple legitimacies framework; that of moral 
legitimacy. Here, I illustrated that local norms prescribing how things ought to be significantly contributes 
to being accepted as legitimate leader. In kwaMeyi, the notion of “African culture” is an ideological 
framework that determines the worldview of locals, especially in evaluating how leaders should behave in 
the exercise of their power.  As Williams describes, “...ideological understandings of the chieftaincy, which 
predate indirect rule, continue to provide a frame of reference for many in the rural areas” (Williams, 2010: 
27). One aspect of this ideological view is the belief that since pre-colonial times chiefs have had a role to 
play in the maintenance of peace, harmony and social cohesion. The image of the chief as a “symbol of 
unity” is so entrenched in kwaMeyi that he is respected as an intermediary in tensions that arise between 
landowners and tenants. Chapter 4 demonstrated that counter to Ntsebeza’s viewpoint that landowners 
do not show allegiance to traditional authorities, kwaMeyi landowners not only respect traditional 
authorities in the area, but expect them to get involved whenever social stability is threatened. In fact, as 
Gogo Noma narrated, they “bow down their heads” in submission to their authority.66 Hence, traditional 
leaders are seen as morally legitimate because they behave in ways that resonate with local norms, 
values and customs, legitimising their political authority in contexts where this should not be happening, 
specifically in titled localities with landowning Africans.  
Avenues for further research 
 
KwaMeyi village is a perplexing place. As this thesis has demonstrated, it has several peculiarities. In the 
first instance, it is a titled locality where black Africans have owned land privately for over one hundred 
years. While historians and other scholars have provided some historical insight as to how this emerged, 
the particular history of KwaMeyi village needs to be investigated through archival research. Conducting 
such research would yield rich material on the emergence of freehold title, specifically, how black people 
in kwaMeyi acquired the land they now possess; how the land became communalized and finally, how 
chiefs came to govern in the area. This kind of study would make a valuable contribution to the academy, 
which is missing an in-depth study on these dynamics currently. This is an enormous gap that needs to 
be addressed so as to arrive at a fuller picture of African landownership and the roles and legitimacy of 
chiefs who preside in such areas.  
 
Another avenue for in-depth research centers on the character of the Mvolosi Traditional Council which 
has jurisdiction over kwaMeyi village. Of particular interest would be the circumstances surrounding chief 
Mavana’s supposed election to the position of chief. Academics like Ntsebeza have oft repeated that for 
so long as the chieftaincy continues to be based on hereditary claims to political authority, they will 
remain the antithesis of democracy which enshrines representative democracy through an electoral 
process (Ntsebeza, 2005; Ntsebeza, 1999a; Ntsebeza, 1999b). In this case study, we have evidence 
from two elderly informants that chief Mavana came into his position after “the post was advertised” and 
he was “voted into power” given his attributes as an educated man. Examining this irregularity would 
                                                 











provide new insights by exploring how local residents were able introduce democratic processes into a 
system of traditional governance where chiefs usually come into power on the basis of hereditary rights. 
The findings of such a study would perhaps signal shifts that are taking place within this institution 
concerning adherence to democratic principles of governance (Cousins, 2007: 303; Fay, 2005; Alcock 




This small study on kwaMeyi village provides a glimpse into the workings of traditional governance in 
relation to people living in titled localities. It proves that traditional leaders do not need to be in control of 
critical resources to ensure their legitimacy as political leaders. This thesis concludes that controlling key 
resources is only one avenue through which political leaders can maintain political legitimacy. What 
comes to the fore is that the character of traditional leaders: their knowledge of the lives of their 
constituents, their accessibility, and their connection to African culture sets them apart from elected 
officials. For these reasons, traditional leaders continue to be highly valued in the communities where 
they serve. For so long as they continue to uphold the moral precepts of these communities and engage 
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Map 1: Location of Umzimkhulu, Eastern Cape province 
 
 


















Map 2: The Location of Umzimkhulu District under Transkei (pre-1994) 
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